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Abstract 
Along with SBCS technology development and the increasing size and prevalence of large 
banks there have been headlines showing increased credit availability for small businesses. 
While this may be true, there is reason to believe that this benefit does not blanket all small 
businesses equally. This research covered various underlying questions concerning SBCS 
technology objectives relative to mergers in the banking sector. Large and small banks 
already exhibit differences in small business lending, but the effects of mergers actually shift 
small business lending away from certain borrowers further. I used both the Mann-Whitney 
U-test and the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests to analyze the datasets. Using a separate-entity 
approach to compare the differences between large-small acquisitions and small-small 
acquisitions using the most recent FDIC merger decision reports (2010-2012), it was found 
that in terms of overall small business loans, increases to small business owners in terms of 
both volume and value for <$100K and $100K-$250K value ranges were significantly higher 
when small banks were acquired by other small banks. Significant differences in the datasets 
for each loan category were also found. In addition, marginally-risked small businesses 
demanding CRE loans may have better chances to receive loans from small banks while 
marginally-risked small businesses demanding C&I loans appear to have a higher supply with 
large banks. Overall, the effects of mergers seem to be in contrast to certain SBCS objectives. 
By comparison, India’s implementation of SBCS technology seems to be more efficient and 
it appears if imitated in America it may hedge against certain negative effects found in this 
research. 
 
Keywords: large bank acquirer, small bank acquirer, small business loans, SBCS objectives, 
separate-entity approach, merger effects, marginally-risked small businesses, India’s SBCS 
technology implementation 
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  I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Background 
America now operates in a day that too big means “too big to fail” and the “too small” simply 
cannot compete. Big is beautiful and it can be argued that there has been a shift from 
supporting everyday businesses ran by everyday people to, in some ways, shunning these 
businesses in favor of their corporate counterparts. The banking sector is a prime example of 
this phenomenon and small banks are currently in a losing battle in lending to small 
businesses as new technology enables large corporate banks to continue their reach to this 
sector. Large banks are becoming very advantageous over smaller banks as the number of 
small banks continues to decline. Concurrently, there has been an increase in the distance 
between borrowers and lenders. Changes will continue further as long as the government 
provides support for a smaller banking sector.   
As distance grows between banks and businesses there is a shift from relationship-
based lending to what some researchers have coined “cookie-cutter” lending methods (see 
Cole, Goldberg, and White, 2004); following predetermined formulas and lending quotas. 
Regulators must monitor this occurrence and not allow small banks that often have 
relationship-lending incorporated in their methods to lose their presence in small business 
lending. The reason for this comes from a few concerns that will be covered later in the text. 
In a span of approximately 20 years, on-going change in the banking sector is highlighted by 
thousands of mergers that have taken place. The number of banks in this time span has 
dropped nearly 33% (Jagtiani, 2008, p. 29). Over half of these mergers have been between 
two small banks, but in term of assets, 43% of these small banks were acquired by banks with 
assets between $1 Billion and $10 Billion. In terms of numbers, well over 30% of these 
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mergers were between large banks in this asset range and small banks with less than $1 
Billion in assets (Jagtiani, 2008, pp. 33-34). This means that if there are observable 
differences in small business lending accredited to these types of mergers, with this much 
concentration it would undoubtedly, collectively affect small businesses. For now, I would 
like to point out that as small community banks continue to be acquired by either type of 
bank there may be both positive and negative effects on small business lending. Much of the 
concern will be placed on smaller firms that are not easy computer-picks for loan 
opportunities, but nonetheless provide jobs to communities. Also, a degree of attention will 
be placed on the paradigm shift in small business lending and its creation of a new 
environment where these businesses are at the mercy of a formula rather than a combination 
of both lending technologies and an established relationship. We cannot allow the full 
automation of a system wherein judgment by a human is completely omitted and 
relationships between banks and borrowers become obsolete.  
The introduction of technology to analyze and rate small businesses by Fair-Isaac, Inc. 
in 1993(5) has allowed commercial banks to penetrate the small business lending market. 
This technology enabled the quantification of the likelihood that a business will default on a 
loan thereby opening the door to a whole new section of the lending portfolio. The structure 
of these lending technologies incorporates only a few, yet strong variables in deciding 
whether a business owner is capable of making loan payments. Incidentally, some research 
points out certain inherent flaws in the models and has, as a result of cases involving large 
banks dropping small business loans from their portfolios in times of recession, created 
concerns regarding the resiliency of large banks to lend to these small businesses during 
economic downturns. During these occurrences, smaller banks are aware of their local 
communities and specialize in relationship-based lending to small businesses in need of funds 
and have more confidently lent following the recent economic slump (Williams, 2013, p. 9).  
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My goals of this research is not to push for the continued existence of all small banks per se, 
but rather to elucidate the importance of knowing and accepting what is necessary in order to 
prevent adverse selection relating to all types of small businesses no matter their financial 
strength. Certain studies such as Berger and Frame (2007, pp. 7-8), and Cole et al (2004, p. 
230) show that at least historically, large banks have the inclination to use ratings produced 
by small business lending technologies, which emphasize financial factors, intensively and 
have tended to auto-accept or reject loans. To further add to the complexity concerning the 
possibility of over-emphasis on financial factors, most SBCS model development does not 
involve other “soft” information such as information gathered from meetings with the 
business owner or key employees. I fear that some pertinent information is not considered. 
This idea stems from the differences in the way America’s small business loans rating 
technologies is implemented compared to India’s implementation of the technology used to 
rate these small businesses. The reason for the comparison to India stems from the fact that 
there is a large concentration of SMEs that significantly contribute to India’s GDP and 
knowing how to fuel growth in this sector has become one of India’s expertise. In the way 
small business information opacity is overcome and the lending process is facilitated in terms 
of the technology itself, there are surely some aspects from which America could learn. 
Following the 2007-08 recession American small businesses relied on a plethora of 
banks which hoarded cash and suppressed economic growth. Small and medium sized firms 
demanded cash to finance growth projects, but due to the opacity in information regarding 
their businesses, banks often hesitated to lend. As the economy has been on the mend, there is 
much coverage that banks are upping their lending to small businesses and that the 
availability of credit is much better than it once was. While the unavailability of SBL may not 
seem like a problem anymore, there are certain concerns that not all small businesses are 
sharing this improvement equally. It is especially interesting to study this area in relation to 
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the ongoing merger trend since the 1990s.  Small banks spread throughout the United States 
are unlike the mammoth banks that have traditionally made their money by extending credit 
to large corporations. These smaller community banks operate within the same communities 
as small firms in need of funds and are therefore more apt to successfully monitor small 
business loans. The top 5 big banks hold about 40% of all domestic deposits but only make 
about 16% of the small business loans in America; this figure has dropped even lower in 
recent times while smaller banks have picked up some of the slack with an increase of $17 
Billion by the end of 2011 (Kassar & Bernstein, 2011).   
Historically, the process of smaller businesses obtaining loans from these larger banks 
were often reflected by an onslaught of inefficiencies pertaining to time consumption and 
bureaucratic loops. These obstacles were not easily hurdled because decisions could not be 
made quickly, particularly because most of the time the loan officer had no established 
relationship with the business owner. Whereas smaller banks have the ability to more 
accurately monitor smaller loans because of the ongoing business relationship they have 
established with the firm often located in the same small community, larger banks have a 
more difficult time. This problem which prevented commercial banks from broadening their 
small business lending portfolios was finally overcame when a new technology was 
developed and implemented by banks starting as early as 1993 (FICO). This new system 
(Small Business Credit Scoring) enabled lending organizations to have a greater ability to 
assess associated risks in lending to small businesses.  
Banks exist for certain reasons and demand profits just like most other businesses. In 
order to accomplish this, lending is absolutely pertinent. Making loans to businesses is a 
regular day-to-day activity that is essential for operations. Banks have to find a safe balance 
between increasing the number of loans and keeping default risk at check. Loaning to 
businesses often gets misconstrued to mean loans to large corporations, but the fact of the 
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matter is that it is really the smaller businesses that need cash to fuel growth and accelerate 
the job market and growth of a nation. Not just the best small businesses, but all small 
businesses need to be aided in order to grow the small business lending market. Larger banks 
have notoriously been inclined to lend to larger firms while refusing to lend to smaller ones. 
Much of this reason lies within the inherent transaction costs in the lending process. Banks 
have to act as intermediaries in monitoring businesses that demand loans but because these 
businesses do not have much public recognition they are ultimately considered riskier. 
Associated monitoring costs in lending to these businesses may not be handled in the most 
efficient way. This coupled with possible merger effects could vitally reshape the small 
business lending environment. Therefore, it is important to monitor for possible public policy 
issues and to take preventative measures if necessary.  
2. Problem Identification 
Much research shows that transactional lending, at least in economic upturns, allows for more 
access to capital for small firms. Transactional lenders, specifically those that are not primary 
fund suppliers to the business, heavily use small business credit scoring models that establish 
ratings primarily focused on eight to twelve factors (Berger & Frame, 2007, p. 7) that as 
research indicates may lead to more type I (not extending loans to quality borrowers) and 
type II errors (extending loans that will default) (Hasumi, Hirata, and Ono, 2012, p. 9). Small 
banks—those that have been broadly defined to have total assets less than $1 billion1—rely 
on Consumer Credit Scoring and relationship-developed soft-information much more 
dominantly than large banks which has not only allowed them to decrease the chance for type 
I and II errors, but Hasumi et al (2012, p.1) also show that long-term performance is higher, 
                                                          
1 According to the Federal Reserve’s December 17, 2008 Joint Press Release, this number is actually $1.109 
billion. Like extant literature, I have for the sake of simplicity used $1 billion as a cut-off.  
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especially during economic downturns. Consequently, small businesses can rely more on 
small rather than large banks to extend loans in subpar economic conditions. 
SBEs in the U.S. experience more difficulty compared to larger businesses when trying to 
acquire capital. Banks and other lending institutions are exposed to asymmetric information 
problems concerning small businesses and cannot accurately measure risk exposure of 
lending to the business and may shy away from it altogether. This is especially true for large 
banks that are not the business’s primary bank, meaning it does not have an established 
relationship with the borrowing firm. Even for small banks that have established relationships 
this asymmetric information poses a problem in keeping their asset portfolio’s risk in check. 
Smaller businesses simply do not have the track record banks need to accurately assess risk 
exposure. To remedy this problem, small lending organizations started checking the small 
business owner’s personal credit score, also known as Consumer Credit Scoring (CCS) to 
analyze the financial history of the borrower (e.g., their loans and payments history). Small 
businesses’ primary banks still use this (along with soft-information) as the most influential 
factor in determining whether to extend loans (Berger, Cowan, and Frame, 2011, p. 3). The 
monitoring process between larger publicly traded corporations and their respective larger 
banks is more efficient because the presence of much more symmetric information allows 
credit rating agencies like S&P, Moody’s and Fitch to develop ratings that enable investors 
and financial institutions alike to assess the risk involved with lending to the particular 
business at hand. Assessing the risk exposure is extremely important on many fronts and 
SBCS technologies work toward banks’ adherence to internal risk controls and Basel 
requirements, distinguishing safe loans from risky loans and being able to establish risk-
based lending (FICO).  
Along with SBCS technology development and the increasing size and prevalence of 
large banks there have been headlines showing increased credit availability for small 
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businesses. While this may be true, there is reason to believe that this benefit does not blanket 
all small businesses equally. More light should be shed on whether certain businesses are 
potentially more positively affected than others. This research will take one major direction 
but attempt to cover various underlying questions concerning SBCS technology and mergers 
in the banking sector. The overall direction pertains to the following question: By using 
SBCS technology, is the commercial bank’s ability to quantify risk associated with higher 
opacity and the following ability to extend risk-based loans to all types of small business loan 
demanders without bias following a merger observed less in reality than in theory? In other 
words, I will study how the effects of mergers may shift SBL by large banks away from 
SBCS objectives. This does not go to say that SBCS technology is not working, but rather I 
am attempting to answer how these two either work together or against one another and how 
this may affect the availability of the different types of small business loans. Most literature 
focuses on changes in SBL as a result of mergers but do not discuss deeply how these 
changes may affect different types of businesses that have different borrowing needs and how 
these changes work toward or against SBCS technology objectives. By highlighting my 
findings in regards to these areas using recent merger data I will attempt to fill this gap as my 
major contribution to existing literature. In order to accomplish this, the following objectives 
and questions are outlined below.  
Throughout this research, I will use certain terms interchangeably. Small business lending 
will be abbreviated as SBL and occasionally small businesses may be referred to as small 
business entities (SBEs). Commercial banks may be referred to as large banks and 
community banks may be referred to as small banks. Lastly, small business credit scoring 
will be referred to as SBCS.  
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3. Research Objectives 
(1) To mark differences between pre-merger small business lending and post-merger 
lending in mergers involving both large acquirers and small acquirers using a single-
entity and separate entity approach for comparison.  
(2) To analyze the recent upward trend in small business lending and to elucidate how 
provided effects may differ among small businesses with different financial soundness.  
(3) To offer an alternative in implementing SBCS technology that may lower the 
transaction costs associated with small business loans burdened by the small bank.  
4. Research Questions 
(1) Are there distinct differences in the small business lending environment subsequent to 
mergers involving different sized acquirers with their respective differences in 
monitoring and the implications for small businesses, including those that are not as 
financially sound? 
(2) Is there a potential disconnect between certain SBCS technology objectives and what 
occurs subsequent to mergers, particularly those involving a large and small bank and 
what are the possible implications for small business owners? 
(3) Are there differences in the small business lending environment of large banks that 
were involved in a merger compared to similar, large banks that were not?  
The flow of this research will begin by covering existing literature in the next chapter to 
discuss the important facts surrounding SBCS technology and the lending environment. This 
will include describing what SBCS is, its development, objectives, and methods. Then SBCS 
technology implementation will be discussed and differences in monitoring between large 
and small banks will be examined. After clarifying what existing literature covers, I then 
highlight my hypotheses to test in order to fill literature’s less discussed areas. The third 
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chapter covers the specific methodology that I will use in order to answer those questions as 
well as sources of data and particular limitations to my research. In closing of the chapter, I 
will state expectations from my study’s results and in chapter 4 I will compare the findings to 
extant literature as well as my expectations. From there, I will reflect on my objectives and 
answer my hypothesis. In chapter five, the final chapter, I will connect the findings to 
possible policy concerns involving small businesses and the acquisition of loans as well as 
alternatives to SBCS technology implementation using India as the focus point in this 
comparison. The final portion will be dedicated to the current ways in which certain 
organizations are already working toward maintaining a solid lending environment for small 
businesses. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Large banks, by nature, have always held certain characteristics in small business lending; 
even with the addition of SBCS technology, certain patterns have emerged that are in contrast 
to small bank lenders. The deviation from past ways in dealing with small business 
relationships; namely relationship lending, has led to a paradigm shift making it difficult for 
many small banks to compete with big-name banks in SBL. SBCS has decreased the need for 
personal relationships that once allowed community banks to have an edge in SBL to in 
recent years not be able to compete with large commercial banks. Commercial banks’ 
competitiveness is largely attributed to its ability to lend at lower rates. Large commercial 
banks are able to offer lower interest rates in two ways: through larger economies of scale 
they enjoy as well as the adoption and use of SBCS technologies in their small business 
lending portfolios. The economies of scale of large commercial banks is quite 
straightforward: due to their size they are able to expand over many territories, especially 
after the introduction of internet banking which enables small businesses to be approved and 
receive loans by accessing lending opportunities over the internet. This allows large banks to 
spread the costs of SBCS technology over a large customer base which makes ratings per 
customer manageable. Nonetheless, when lender-borrower proximity is closer more 
information regarding borrowers is held by community banks which increases credit 
availability. The more community banks there are operating in the same communities as 
borrowers the more small businesses can be accepted for loan opportunities. With differences 
in monitoring, however, it may be more costly to small businesses.  
According to Cole et al (2004) and Jagtiani (2008), following a 33% drop in the number 
of banks between the years 1990-2006 there has been an uproar of public policy concerns that 
a substantial decrease in the number of small banks may hamper the ability for small 
businesses to obtain loans. “It is well established that larger banks allocate smaller 
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percentages of their assets to small business loans than do smaller banks” (Cole et al, 2004, p. 
228). Besides the fact that there are major monitoring differences between large and small 
banks, large banks specialize in large business loans with no information transparency issues. 
These differences, however, are not the only reasons to believe that small businesses may be 
affected by continued mergers in the banking sector. Agarwal, Sumit and Hauswald (2010) 
show that even distance plays a role in affecting SBL. Using extant literature the following 
sections will go into further detail regarding the differences in monitoring between large and 
small banks (e.g., relationship vs. transactional lending and differences regarding rating 
technologies) and the effects of mergers. Evidence for existing concern will be highlighted 
followed by other concerns that I have along with my hypotheses. 
1. SBCS Technology: The Good, Bad and Rejected 
1.1 What is SBCS Technology? 
SBCS is a quite new phenomenon in the banking industry that has been utilized by larger 
lending institutions and comes in many forms tailored to specific needs. In general, SBCS 
technology “involves analyzing consumer data about the owner of the firm and combining it 
with relatively limited data about the firm itself using statistical methods to predict future 
credit performance” (Berger & Frame, 2007, p. 6). In the words of Loretta Mester, vice 
president and economist for the Research Department at the Philadelphia Federal Reserve 
Bank and the head of the department’s Banking and Financial Markets section,   
Credit scoring is a method of evaluating the credit risk of loan applications. Using 
historical data and statistical techniques, credit scoring tries to isolate the effects of 
various applicant characteristics on delinquencies and defaults. The method produces 
a ‘score’ that a bank can use to rank its loan applicants or borrowers in terms of risk. 
(p. 4) 
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Credit rating models are imperfect predictors of default or serious delinquencies but should 
assign higher scores to businesses that perform well and lower scores to businesses with 
subpar performances. Imperfect means the models will sometimes be prone to type I and II 
errors; some borrowers will not receive a rating that is truly representative of their ability to 
make timely payments. Much of the concern involving this technology lies in the way 
commercial banks utilize the technology. Large banks often have tendencies to use the 
technology as an automatic decision-making tool in accepting or rejecting loans. This factor 
along with other differences large banks exhibit in small business lending raises other 
concerns as well. Much of this research is related to whether it is possible some small 
business owners are not equally benefited by the shift of ownership of SBL loans to large 
bank lenders.   
SBCS is used to rate different types of loans depending on the specific type of 
technology that is implemented by the bank. Over the past twenty-five years SBCS has been 
widely used in consumer credit markets to issue credit cards and other types of loans such as 
auto loans and home equity loans (Loretta, 1997, pp. 5-6). It was not until the 1990s that 
models fit for business loans were developed by the Fair-Isaac Corporation. As previously 
mentioned, SBCS is a hard-information oriented transactions lending tool that dissolved the 
need for close proximity and established relationships (Berger & Frame, 2007, p. 6). Berger 
and Frame continue to explain that although there are other types of technologies that also 
focus on financial factors, SBCS involves “personal consumer data on the owner obtained 
from consumer credit bureaus, data on the business collected by the financial institution, and 
in some cases, information on the firm from commercial credit bureaus.” This technology is 
not solely used for opaque businesses. The technology can also be used to reduce 
underwriting costs that negatively affect bank financial performance. Therefore, it is easy to 
notice that in more than one way, large banks have developed a competitive edge in SBL 
13 
 
accredited to the technology and differences in bank characteristics such as economies of 
scale.  
1.2 SBCS Development 
According to Berger and Frame (2007) most large U.S. banks did not adopt SBCS until the 
mid-1990s because the loan process was non-standardized and too much heterogeneity 
existed. This heterogeneity covers many different aspects that made it difficult to pool data 
together which hindered predictability in the models. Each bank has different underwriting 
approaches and there are many different borrowers of varying financial strength and loan 
volume and value demands. Adaptations of past models occurred when there was a statistical 
realization that variation in the smallest business credits were highly explained by 
information pertaining to the principal owners (p. 7).   
Most models in existence have conjointly worked with Robert Morris Associates and 
Fair-Isaac—the largest external provider of SBCS—and therefore Fair-Isaac’s Small 
Business Scoring System (SBSS®) will be used in explaining the technology’s development. 
Development of SBCS technologies involved separating loans into three categories: good, 
bad, and rejected loans. For SBSS® good was defined as one that had not been 30 days 
delinquent more than twice in the first four years outstanding, bad was one that was more 
than 60 days delinquent. Rejected loans were examined for characteristics; this process was 
known as reject inference (Hand & Henley, 1997, p. 526). After these loans were separated, 
statisticians could then formulate models using actual loan performances. Participating banks 
provided 300 accounts (100 good, 100 bad and 100 rejected) along with consumer credit 
bureau reports for up to two of the company owners and the company’s commercial credit 
report (Asch, 1995 as cited by Longenecker, Moore, Petty, 1997, p. 7). In total, 17 large 
domestic banks (later reformed to 25) participated in providing FICO with the needed data 
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(Berger & Frame, 2007, p. 8). The four sources of data used to create the model were as 
follows:  
1) Consumer credit bureau report data, 
2) Business credit bureau report data, 
3) Company financial ratios restated relative to RMA2 industry norms, 
4) Credit application data. 
Asch as cited by Longenecker et al continues that weighted scores of the owners were 
calculated and then combined with the firms’ scores and then highly collinear variables or 
those that did not make much contribution to predictability were omitted from the model. In 
general, scores pertaining to the owner included factors such as income, net worth, available 
credit, prior delinquencies and bankruptcies (Berger & Frame, 2007, p. 7). Berger and Frame 
go on to state that scores relating to the firm include financial ratios (e.g., profitability and 
leverage), the presence of past credit problems, as well as the type of business by standard 
industrial classification (SIC). Segmentation analysis was also conducted to increase 
predictive power. Subpopulations were created based on sales, status of incorporation, 
geographic location, loan type (line of credit, or term loan), industry groupings, and total 
current request for credit. Upon completion of the data examination, two scorecards were 
used based on the total current request for credit: 1) firms requesting less than $35,000, and 
2) firms requesting more than $35,000. The preceding methodology in creating the models 
for SBSS® was again based on good and bad loans. To ensure population representation, 
reject inference 3  was used to simulate how the rejected loans, if accepted, would have 
performed.  
                                                          
2 Risk Management Association 
3 More on reject inference can be found in Longenecker et al (1997, p. 7).  
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2. Implementation and Monitoring 
2.1 Commercial vs. Community Banks 
According to Berger and Frame (2007), most large banks, even though they may have 
proprietary models, usually purchase SBCS technology from outside vendors. This is 
especially true when banks extend loans outside communities in which they operate a branch. 
It is common to purchase these models from the Fair-Isaac Corporation due to its array of 
products. They have several different models that can tailor to different bank strategies. For 
example, there are models depending on the type of credit (e.g., loans, leases, line of credits), 
and the size of credit—loans under $50K, less than $100K, or less than $250K. Some lenders 
only use the models for credits under $100K, others may use a combination of them. There 
are also less mature models aimed at credits in excess of $250K (p. 8). Nonetheless, more 
commonly large banks use the technology more for rating smaller small business loans. This 
is not surprising because large banks tend to specialize in large loans where more interest 
revenue can be earned and therefore may be capable of rating these loans using proprietary 
models.  
In SBL, since large banks focus on using the technology for lower value loans it appears 
large banks are still more confident in lending larger value loans just as it specializes in 
lending to large businesses—and therefore large loans—rather than small businesses. Large 
banks have not opened up equally to small businesses as they have with large businesses. 
SBCS technology aims to allow large banks to open up more to small businesses than they 
would have in absence of the technology. However, as Glenn Goldman, chief executive of 
Capital Access Network, which helps small businesses find credit, states, “It’s much more 
efficient to devote time to a single $1 million transaction than to twenty $20,000 transactions” 
(Helm, 2013). Therefore, the potential push-and-pull factor between a large bank’s expertise 
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and SBCS technology must be scrutinized. Also, not all large banks use the technology in the 
same fashion. Large banks could also use the technology with the major purpose of reducing 
the opacity problem and to be able to set contract terms more accurately (Berger & Frame, 
2007, p. 8). This purpose for using the technology will be consistent with relatively higher 
monitoring costs which hamper bank flexibility in lending more SBL; these banks will tend 
to have less risk, but fewer small business loans than comparable banks that use the 
technology with a cost-saving strategy.  
In order to justify lending to small businesses that will generate less interest revenue per 
loan, of course large banks, and often small banks, have to minimize associated transaction 
costs and have sufficient loan volume. Therefore, it is not surprising to see more 
concentration in the microloan section within the lending portfolio. However, it is essential to 
keep in mind that it may be enticing for commercial banks to use the technology as an “auto-
accept/reject” tool in order to meet the volume levels that justify the increased exposure—a 
numbers game (Berger & Frame, 2007, p. 8). In fact, research suggests that reduced 
underwriting costs, which are associated with auto-accept/reject usage, is the dominant way 
to implement the technology (Berger & Frame, 2007, p. 19). Essentially, large banks use the 
cost-saving feature as a way to offset the potential losses from bad loans as loan volume 
increases. Hence, it is worthy to consider the possible downside of heavy reliance on large 
banks for loan opportunities in the wake of an ongoing merger trend since the 1990s. “We 
never want to see lenders in the position where they are skimming off the easiest loans,” says 
David Jeffers, Fannie Mae’s vice president for corporation relations for eleven years 
(Longenecker et al, 1997, p. 9). Indeed, small businesses never want to see this occur in the 
lending sector which decreases the chances for marginally-risked businesses to obtain loans. 
However, Ami Kassar, founder and chief executive of Multifunding, a small business loan 
brokerage, claims that it may already be too late:  even though small business lending has 
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picked up, large lenders are only aggressively lending to the top 10% of financially strong 
firms (Quittner, 2013). More information on the trend of small business lending is presented 
in the Trends and Performance in the Banking Sector section.  
Community banks do not currently heavily use SBCS technology. According to 
Berger et al (2011) in terms of rating technology, small banks tend to focus on using 
Consumer Credit Scoring (CCS) technology driven from information on the principal owner 
rather than the business itself (p. 4). Another key point, however, is in addition to these 
scoring models, community banks—often acting as SBEs’ primary banks—have access to 
soft-information regarding the business and owner that large banks mainly do not. Soft-
information is by nature mostly qualitative where much of the determining factors concern 
information gathered over time from relationships (Berger & Frame, 2007, p. 6). Since small 
banks utilize this type of loan monitoring, they are often referred to as “relationship lenders.” 
Community banks rarely use scoring as auto-accept tools and frequently use different sources 
of information simultaneously in the decision of whether to extend loans (p. 16). In the same 
study, it was found that only around 14% of small banks use SBCS technology at all. It is 
important to note the reason for this, however. Small banks are known to face several 
difficulties in contrast to large banks: the inability to take advantage of economies of scale in 
operating expenses; and the inability to attract a pool of new customers due to (a) a thin 
selection of financial services and (b) competition with nonbank financial institutions 
(Emmons, R Alton, & Yeager, 2004, pp. 1-2). Therefore, it has been impractical for small 
banks to implement SBCS due to high capital costs and low loan volume (Longenecker, 1997, 
p. 8). Nonetheless, small banks’ combination of CCS and soft-information allows for more 
accurate ex-ante monitoring (i.e., fewer type I & II errors), interim, or ongoing monitoring, 
and ex-post monitoring.  
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Where large banks tend to be more rules based, small banks have notably more 
flexibility in ex-ante monitoring for loans. Loan officers at small bank branches do not have 
to endure so many bureaucratic disempowerments to extend loans; there is more of a 
“character” based approach (Cole et al, 2004, p. 229). Large banks face a more severe threat 
of agency issues than do small banks where “top management can more easily monitor the 
behavior of loan officers and coordinate operations” (Cole et al, 2004, p. 230). Much of the 
reason for this is that managers and owners have a greater chance to be the same in small 
bank operations. It follows that information centered on established relationships have more 
focus than formulas in assessing whether to extend a loan.  
In order to describe more in detail the differences in monitoring between large and 
small banks I turn to the results from a study conducted by Cole et al (2004) concerning 
distinctions in variable importance in the decision to accept a loan. These findings are 
highlighted in figure 1. Going down the t-test column in Panel D, there is a significant 
difference in the firm size variable between the two banks. This means that small banks lend 
more to smaller small businesses than do large banks. The next significant difference is the 
African-American variable. Cole et al (2004) interpret this not as racial discrimination, but 
rather a gray-area between some of the financial factors such as an owner’s personal wealth, 
income and credit history. SBCS technology, which generates scores that banks tend to 
heavily use, allows for explicit reason in accepting or rejecting a loan. This enables large 
bank lenders to not violate the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.4 Small banks appear to favor 
minorities—again most likely explained by less emphasis on financial factors. Whether the 
business owner banks in person also plays a significantly different role in acceptance between 
the banks. This supports the importance of relationship lending by small banks and the lack 
                                                          
4 For details, see Equal Credit Opportunity Act legislation by the United States DOJ. Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 1691. 
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thereof in large banks. Standalone significant factors for large banks in the acceptance of 
loans are as follows: being able to provide accurate financial information, cash-to-assets, 
African-American ownership, loan-size-to-assets, the number of sources and whether the 
business banks in person. Accurate financial information is key to getting accepted at large 
banks. This is consistent with their inclination to use SBCS with particular emphasis on 
financial factors. The same goes for cash-to-assets and African-American ownership because 
both are related to financial factors. Significance in the number of sources SBEs use is 
consistent with large banks preferring to be the only supplier of funds to a particular business. 
In other words, large banks are less inclined to lend to recipients of multiple sources of funds 
(p.248). The negative significance of whether the borrower banks in person is consistent with 
the large bank lending nature to lend across longer distances which make it impractical for 
owners to bank in person.  
Small bank standalone significant variables are as follows:  firm and owner 
delinquencies, loan amount, and deposit and loan relationships. Firm and ownership 
delinquencies comes as somewhat of a surprise because typically large banks are more prone 
to focus on standard criteria in approving a loan. Nonetheless, even though small banks show 
more flexibility in lending to businesses than do large banks, it seems past delinquencies are 
still a major concern for acceptance among small banks. The negative sign for loan amount 
suggests that small banks tend to lend more to smaller small businesses than do large banks. 
With smaller assets, small banks simply do not have the capacity like large banks do in 
lending high-value loans. Finally, deposit and loan relationships is again consistent with 
small bank nature to lend more based on relationships. Having an existing relationship before 
applying for a loan at a small bank is associated with a higher chance of acceptance. Shared 
significant factors between both banks are firm size and age. The older and larger the firm is 
the more loan availability there is by both banks. However, magnitudes for both variables are 
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higher for large banks but only statistically significant for firm size. Firm size and age are not 
only associated with financial factors such as revenue, which large banks favor, but also the 
availability of more soft-information, which small banks favor.  
 
  
 
Figure 1. Differences in Monitoring Between Large and Small Banks 
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2.2 SBCS Objectives 
SBCS technology has of course been completely essential in allowing commercial banks to 
penetrate the small business lending sector. The technology’s purpose is centralized around 
enabling banks to reach multiple objectives that not only increases bank efficiency, but is also 
aimed at benefiting SBEs. The main objectives of SBCS according to Mester, L. (1997) and 
Berger et al (2011) along with a more detailed description are as follows: 
 Decrease the time it takes to monitor for a loan.  
 Allow for equal assessment of potential borrowers. 
 Increase the overall quantity of small business lending. 
 Increase small business lending to marginally-risked borrowers. 
 The ability to lend over longer distances. 
Starting with some of the most obvious objectives, SBCS technology is designed to increase 
the rate at which businesses can be monitored in the ex-ante and subsequently be decided of 
worthiness for a loan. Mester, L. (1997) explains that SBCS greatly reduces monitoring time 
from approximately 12.5 hours to less than an hour (p. 8). The actual time it takes to monitor 
for a loan depends on whether the particular bank relies solely on the technology or 
conjunctively uses other information. The second objective listed deals with fair monitoring 
regardless of borrower characteristics such as race, gender, etc. in adherence to The Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act (p. 9). Furthermore, the technology is supposed to be unbiased in 
increasing lending in all areas no matter the local income ranges. SBCS allows for explicit 
reasoning in whether it approved or rejected a business loan. Initial concerns were that low-
income borrowers or minorities—who may be associated with different borrowing needs—
may not be incorporated in the data from which the models were built (p. 9). Even though, 
according to a study by Fair-Isaac this proved not to be the case, concern over the model’s 
resiliency remains intact which is discussed in more detail in the next section. The next 
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objective, presented in Berger et al (2011) is an increase in the quantity of SBL. Since SBCS 
technology shortens the time needed for business assessment and loan decisions, more 
businesses can receive loans. Many banks show this to be the case. One such example is the 
Hibernia Corporation, a Louisiana bank that at the time had $6.3 billion in assets. Before 
implementing the technology, Hibernia typically processed 100 applications a month. After 
implementation, this number jumped up to 1,100 applicants per month (Longenecker et al, 
1997, p. 8). The next objective mentioned is to allow more lending to relatively riskier 
borrowers. SBCS assigns a rating to businesses which enables banks to conduct risk-based 
lending in setting loan rates where riskier borrowers pay a higher interest rate than safer 
businesses. In essence, SBCS is aimed not only to improve the ability to lend more in terms 
of raw numbers, but also it is aimed to increase loan availability to marginally-risked 
businesses. This should also include the increased capacity to lend to other business sectors 
other than commercial and industrial loans with the help of SBCS that can apply ratings to 
businesses in other industries. Finally, not surprisingly, it is aimed at increasing lending over 
longer distances (Berger et al, 2011, p. 2). One of the main attractions of the technology for 
large banks is the newfound ability to lend outside of their own territories and without any 
prior relationships increase their SBL portfolios. This last objective is quite inclusive and in-
part includes other goals of the technology. For the sake of meticulousness, I broke them 
down into separate points.   
2.3 Pitfalls 
2.3.1 Scoring Methods 
Some concern regarding the accuracy of the models, and therefore the effects on small 
businesses, stems from economical perspectives. The belief is that these models were created 
using data on businesses that do not take into consideration the effects of economic 
downturns on the predictability of the models (Mester, 1997, p. 10). Historically, when 
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economic slumps prevail, SBCS loans have performed sub-optimally compared with loans 
extended between relationship lenders and the respective borrowers. Evidence has been 
provided by other studies that in economic downturns SBCS loans sustain a 0.82 percentage-
point increase in the probability of default compared with loans by primary banks that show a 
0.46 percentage-point decrease in default probability (Hasumi et al, 2012, p. 24).  
A potential inherent problem which lies in FICO’s SBSS® and other SBCS models is that 
data is pooled from previously existing loans that may be, according to certain studies, 
exposed to selection bias. By using preexisting small business owner information there may 
be some instances where models produce unrepresentative scores on businesses which may 
give rise to issues regarding the accuracy in assessing small firms. Hand and Henley (1997) 
shed light on this issue in discussion of population drift. This means that as time passes there 
may be a shift in the distributions of small businesses that may prove detrimental to the 
predictability of SBCS models. This is expected due to the fact that “applicant populations 
are subject to economic pressures and a changing competitive environment” (p. 525). If 
banks using SBCS technology increases its lending to small businesses by using mass 
marketing, it is essential the pool of lenders behave the same way lenders do from which the 
models were built; otherwise, “the model may not accurately predict the behavior of these 
new applicants” (Mester, 1997, p. 10).  
In terms of particular statistical methods, linear probability, logit, probit, and 
discriminant analysis are all different models that can be used. It is essential to say 
nonetheless each model assumes different assumptions on the distribution of the data (Hand 
& Henley, 1997, p. 525). Therefore, it follows that as the distribution of the applicant 
population possibly shifts, the certain type of statistical models being implemented becomes 
very important. This perhaps goes to explain the findings by Williams, V. (2013) that in 
economic downturns large banks are outperformed in SBL by relationship lenders that utilize 
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both CCS, which mostly pertains to financial data on the business owner, as well as existing 
relationships which provide lenders with more soft-information on not only the borrower but 
also the business.  
It is important to keep in mind SBCS technologies could also contain certain bias 
generated from protecting “secret formulas.” If a company has produced its own rating 
technology, it will not be willing to be completely transparent to the academic community 
because providing too much information could be detrimental to its core competence. Other 
problems revolve around protecting applicant confidentiality (Hand & Henley, 1997, p. 526). 
So in measuring whether SBCS technology is as good as it is proclaimed to be, we should not 
focus on the positive attributes the technology is supposed to provide but rather monitor the 
performances and compare these performances to loans extended by small banks to assess 
how the technology is actually used. Numerous studies exist on the matter. Other than 
keeping secret formulas out of the public eye, the actual type of SBCS banks choose to 
implement also becomes a very important factor. As it has already been established, there are 
a few different models which can provide flexibility in ex-ante monitoring for loans, but at 
the same time requires banks to actually select the specific model or combination of models 
which I fear could lead to bias ratings or adverse selection and an increase in the transaction 
costs burdened by banks if the specific models are not representative of the borrowers. One 
model cannot fit all types of small businesses and the purchase of multiple models increases 
costs that lenders have to underwrite. These models, therefore, do have innate flaws and are 
truly imperfect predictors.  
2.3.2 The Larry Rule 
Especially in the case of large banks that possess the cost-saving motive for applying SBCS 
in loan selection, some businesses that are credit worthy will not be extended loans because 
other soft information is non-existent. This information involving the business and business 
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owner is essential to more accurately assess the risk involved in the lending process. Without 
this information the adverse selection problem is likely to occur and marginally-risked 
businesses may endure more difficulties obtaining loans. Adverse selection can be noticed in 
the following example that illustrates innate flaws in numbers gaming. Larry Lindsey, a 
former Federal Reserve governor, was once denied a ToysRus® application because the 
model did not take into account sufficient soft information (Dean, 2008). Although the Larry 
Rule applies to consumer loans, I contend that this same type of error can be observed in the 
banking sector in extending small business loans when less-than-optimal information about 
the firm is held by the lending institution.   
Mr. Lindsey elucidated a specific problem occurring when too much emphasis is 
placed on numbers. He showed that it is nothing other than possible for a person to be denied 
credit when a flawed system is used. In this case, personal credit bureaus placed too much 
emphasis on the number of applications for store-specific credit cards as a signal for a riskier 
borrower. Having a six-figure income, being a millionaire, and being a member of the most 
prestigious financial committee of the world should be proof enough that he is quite capable 
of making timely payments (Dean, 2008). However, because the system was flawed and did 
not take into consideration other, more important factors, Mr. Lindsey was denied the credit 
card. This goes to show it is very possible that by focusing too intensively on numbers 
(numbers gaming) worthy borrowers may be shunned, or turned away. This problem is 
exacerbated when small businesses increasingly rely on large banks for loans. 
3. Mergers in the Banking Sector: A Paradigm Shift in Small Business 
Lending 
3.1 Bank Consolidation 
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The 33% drop in the number of community banks over a 20-year time span discussed earlier 
does not portray the whole picture of the extensive consolidation that has taken place. 
According to the 2012 FDIC Community Bank Study, over nearly a 30-year period from 
1984 to 2011, as the number of FDIC insured banks and thrift institutions fell 59%, total 
industry assets grew almost fourfold, from $3.7 trillion to $13.9 trillion (p. 2-4). Banks with 
over $10 billion in assets held almost all of this growth with most of the concentration in the 
largest institutions. Discussing change in the number of institutions is also paramount in 
explaining the merger trend. These changes are highlighted in table 1 and figure 2. Looking 
first at table 1, from 1994 to 2011, the number of banking offices held by the four largest 
BHCs rose from 3,904 to 18,743. In terms of the percent of total U.S. banking offices, offices 
held by these institutions experienced a 14.3% increase to 19.1%. In terms of all institutions 
holding greater than $10 billion in assets in 1984, the percentage of assets held by these 
banks by 2011 increased elevenfold to 80%. Overall, the 107 largest institutions acquired or 
consolidated 1,258 charters worth $5.6 trillion in total assets (p. 2-3). Of these 1,258 charters, 
targets had already directly or indirectly acquired or consolidated 7,515 charters since 1984. 
In other words, large banks in excess of $10 billion in assets acquired (directly or indirectly) 
57% of all charters that exited the industry between 1984 and 2011 (p. 2-9). 
Referring to figure 2, in 1984, there were 15,663 banking institutions with less than 
$1 billion in assets and 2,238 institutions with greater than $1 billion in assets. By 2011 these 
numbers changed to 6,794 and 563, respectively. These numbers truly show just how much 
Number of Banking 
Offices
Percent of Total 
U.S. Banking Offices
Total Offices of Banking Organizations That Became the Four Largest by 2011
-
Total Banking Offices of the Four BHCs in 1994
Offices Added Through Acquistion, 1994-2011
Total Banking Offices of the Four BHCs in 2011
3,904
12,859
18,743
4.8%
19.1%
Table 1. Total Offices of Banking Organizations that Became the Four Largest by 2011 
(Source: FDIC, 2012) 
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consolidation has reshaped the banking industry. Within the large bank group with over $10 
billion in assets that did not become a part of the four largest institutions by 2011, 29 
institutions held 22% of industry assets (p. 2-4). By 2011, there were 94 banks that held 35% 
of industry assets. This ongoing consolidation trend, in turn, presents both a direct and 
indirect threat to small businesses in needs of capital. On an aggregate basis, even if initial 
mergers do not effect small business borrowers it is not out of the question, through other 
bank mergers, for very large banks to eventually capture once small banks. To make matters 
worse, in the time period from 1984 to 2011, the composition of these largest institutions 
shifted toward retail lending. In other words, as banks become larger there is a tendency for 
banks to shift away from SBL to other forms of lending.    
Figure 2 also shows that even the 4,888 newly created charters declined by 59% with 
the majority exiting through merger (p. 2-11). This casts doubt on Denovo banks’ ability to 
pick up marginally-risked businesses that are declined for loans at large institutions. Small 
banks, through intense competition with large commercial banks, make up the majority of 
failed banks among the 1984-base banks and newly chartered banks in this time period (74%). 
Traditionally, small banks had a comparative advantage in lending to small businesses for a 
number of reasons:  they had closer ties to local businesses which often meant established 
relationships; a small scale of operations provided an advantage over large banks in that there 
were fewer levels of hierarchy to prevent easy acceptance of loan requests (Petersen and 
Rajan, 2002; Berger, 2003; Bernanke, 2006 as cited by Gilbert & Wheelcock, 2013, p. 199). 
Small banks capitalized on a simple system that worked. Many different small banks could 
span over many territories and lend to many small businesses in need of capital. This system 
worked because banks could lend to businesses in close proximity which meant the 
availability of soft-information. 
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Historically, a large number of small banks heightened efficacy in this type of system. 
Once the number of banks decreased, more and more soft-information on potential borrowers 
started to dissipate. Therefore, the efficiency sustained by their niche in lending to small 
businesses also began to wane. As the number of small banks has drastically decreased since 
the 1990s, along with the saturation of SBCS rating methodologies among large banks, the 
share of small business lending has drastically changed for both commercial and community 
banks. A few decades ago, small banks held the majority of SBL. In 2012, large and very 
large banks together account for more than 68.6% of total small business loans (Williams, 
2013, p. 11). It is evident in this drastic change small banks are no longer strong enough to 
compete in the area where a niche used to be held. Thus, changes in SBL due to recent 
advances in large bank SBL policies coupled with the effects of mergers are of key 
significance. As big bank market share for SBL has increased, it has become harder for small 
banks to compete since larger institutions offer lower rates and have stronger brand images, 
market influence, and product diversity that attempts to tailor to small business owners’ 
Figure 2. Transition Matrix: Structural Change Among 
Community and Non-community Banks, 1984-2011  
(Source: FDIC, 2012) 
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specific needs. Lately, small banks too are finding innovative ways to stay competitive 
partaking in projects to provide as much service as possible to recapture some of its core 
competence in helping small businesses in their communities. This will not be enough to 
recapture its competiveness, however. Other measures will have to be taken. 
3.2 Trends and Performance in the Banking Sector  
3.2.1 Trends in Small Business Loan Supply and Demand  
Data shows a trend for commercial banks to seemingly misuse SBCS technologies in the 
manner that large banks have a tendency to auto-accept or reject loans. Studies such as 
Berger et al (2011) mark the differences in the way commercial banks and community banks 
implement the technologies. Large banks that are inclined to heavily weigh small business 
credit scores implies that small businesses with strong balance sheets and income statements 
are able to have access to more loans while the others have to turn to non-traditional lenders 
and credit unions. Turning to other lenders, however, may not be so easy. According to a 
study by Biz2Credit presented in figure 3, which analyzed primary data related to small 
businesses that had credit scores of at least 680 cited by Quittner (2013) in an article from 
Inc.com, large banks increased their lending in the $25,000 to $3 million range by 6.1% from 
July 2012 to July 2013. Figures of a 2% increase, a 9.5% decrease, and a .9% decrease for 
small banks, credit unions and non-traditional alternative lenders respectively are shown. It is 
for this reason claims that small businesses released from the loan portfolios of large bank 
acquirers following a merger are picked up by other small banks or alternative lenders lose 
some assurance in light of these figures. On one hand, this figure shows a substantial increase 
in the approval rate for financially strong small businesses among large banks. On the other 
hand, however, other lenders’ approval rates for these businesses are stagnant and if, 
consequent to a merger, marginally risked small businesses were to be dropped it may be 
difficult to find a loan with other remaining banks when even the financially sound small 
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business loan approval rates are just 49.4%, 45.1%, and 63.2% for small banks, credit unions 
and alternative lenders, respectively. 
  
Following the Lehman Shock and the recession that followed, according to a 2012 bank 
study conducted by the Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy small 
businesses’ demand for loans has continued to decline. According to Kassar and Bernstein 
(2011) much of this may be explained by small business owners’ lack of willingness to 
endure the associated transaction costs in trying to secure funds from banks. When SBEs do 
go to acquire capital, one trend that has emerged is the transition in how small businesses 
now have a greater tendency to switch from their primary banks to longer distanced 
commercial banks in response to advances in SBL policies. This trend is the result of more 
than one factor. One element is a fuller saturation of SBCS technology used by large 
institutional lenders. Since commercial banks are using this technology at a higher propensity, 
smaller banks have had heavier competition in loan rates. The second factor is a decreased 
proportion of small banks and the effect of longer distances between borrowers and lenders as 
a result of on-going mergers that has led to borrowers being more indifferent in choosing 
between large or small banks (Agarwal et al, 2010). Primary banks (i.e., small banks in close 
Figure 3. Small Business Loan Bank Approval Rates 
(Source: A study conducted by Biz2Credit) 
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proximity) actually monitor loans more accurately than non-primary banks and because of the 
greater ability to monitor, they are able to, on average, lend more in times of economic 
hardship. If a small business chooses to go acquire capital from a second source, Agarwal et 
al (2010) also found, however, the decision to obtain loans from a non-primary bank can be 
detrimental to the relationship held between the primary bank and small business. Therefore, 
in economic upturns small businesses may change lenders to take advantage of lower rates, 
but when the economy begins to contract migration back to primary banks may not be 
entirely possible and could possibly contribute to harder acquisition of funds for the borrower 
in times of economic downturns.   
Findings from Cole et al (2004), presented in figure 4, mark differences in both the 
demand by small businesses in choosing either a large or small bank for funds and the supply 
of funds to small businesses on the basis of a number of variables. Focusing on the fourth 
column of firm and owner characteristics, it can be observed which factors hold significant 
difference in whether an owner chooses a large or small bank. I will go through the list and 
explain what each result may entail starting with firm size. The significant difference in 
means between large bank and small bank subsamples show that larger small businesses 
prefer to acquire loans from large banks. The difference in cash-to-assets signals that more 
liquid firms tend to use large banks for loans which is not shocking knowing large banks 
actually prefer financially strong firms. Cole et al (2004) does not explicitly offer an 
interpretation for the significance found in female ownership, but female ownership may be 
correlated with more accurate or perhaps better organized paperwork or stronger financials 
than male-ownership firms. The significance in owner’s age could be explained through 
longer relationships established between owners and small banks. It may be safe to assume in 
relation to this, small banks are more comfortable with loaning to more experienced business 
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owners and trust the judgment of these individuals more so than large banks (i.e., lending 
more on characteristic attributes). 
Shifting the focus to loan and relationship characteristics, which discuss loan supply, 
small banks approve significantly more loans than large banks do; but large banks approve 
loans of greater value. Small banks significantly lend more to small businesses based on 
relationship characteristics with the exception of distance between borrower and lender. 
Small banks are more inclined to approve loans with borrowers who already use the bank for 
deposits or for other loan sources. Longer relationships and whether the borrower banks in 
person, as previously established, are more important to small banks that also incorporate 
soft-information into loan monitoring. Knowing one of SBCS technology’s objectives is to 
increase lending for large banks over greater distances, the significantly greater mean in large 
banks over small banks to lend to customers farther away comes as no surprise. The last 
essential element in whether a small business chooses a large or small bank is whether the 
business is located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area.5 
                                                          
5 A single county may be defined as a MSA if it has either (a) a city or a Census Bureau-defined urbanized area 
with a population of at least 50,000, or (b) a total Metropolitan Area population of at least 100,000 (Disalvo, 
1999, p. 3). 
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3.2.2 Geographical Considerations 
This section attempts to bridge a connection between changes in SBL and changes in 
geographical locations of remaining banks following the ongoing trend of mergers since 1984. 
Due to the tendency for large banks to operate in Metropolitan Statistical Areas coupled with 
the fact that increasingly more small banks are being absorbed into large, non-community 
banks, banks operating in non-metro areas are diminishing and the result is a strain on 
relationship lending (e.g., between primary banks and small businesses). This means that 
distance between demanding small businesses and fund suppliers increases and fewer small 
business loans are underwritten by relationship lenders causing even more small business 
dependency on SBCS technology as more businesses rely on large banks to provide loans. As 
Figure 4. Supply and Demand Factors for Loans 
34 
 
mergers continue, a cause for concern is created in that as the number of banks decreases and 
as distance grows between commercial banks and small businesses, in addition to the effects 
of merger themselves, certain small business borrowers may be negatively affected. In 
essence, as distance between borrowers increases less information is held by large institutions 
concerning borrowers. Possessing less information over borrowers gives no other option than 
to heavily rely on SBCS technology to rate the businesses.  
Certain businesses that look marginal on paper will be one of the most impacted 
groups within the small business pool. It is possible these businesses would have still 
received loans from small banks based on character criteria, but increased distance between 
borrowers and lenders has created a shift away from character based lending which makes it 
more difficult for these businesses to receive funds. There are also fundamental differences 
between large and small banks and where there is a tendency to operate offices. Large banks 
gravitate to metro areas while small banks tend to have significantly more offices in non-
metro areas (FDIC, 2012, pp. 3-5-3-6). Due to the nature for large banks to gravitate to these 
areas, many small businesses operating in rural areas will be greatly affected by consolidation. 
According to the 2012 FDIC Community Banking Study, in 2011, “there were 629 U.S. 
counties, with just over 6 million in population, where community banks operated offices, but 
where no non-community banking offices were present” (p. 3-5). Three-quarters of this area 
was rural and 14% was in metro areas. Including areas that had fewer than three non-
community banking offices present, a total of 1,200 U.S. counties (out of 3,238) 
encompassing 16.3 million people would have had limited access to funds without the 
presence of community banks.  
Putting this together, small businesses in rural areas (and even some metropolitan 
areas) that have a higher propensity to demand loans other than for commercial and industrial 
purposes may take a hit. As the number of community banks declines and as there is a shift 
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from rural to metropolitan areas, it appears the businesses that stand the most to lose are 
marginally-risked businesses in need of funds for farm and other agricultural purposes. 
Therefore, it is essential that community banks remain active in these areas so all types of 
small business owners can acquire capital to run their businesses. In 2011, community banks 
still own more than 70% of both offices and deposits in rural areas. Another point of 
consideration is how population may be changing relative to community bank presence in 
areas of change. As noted, small banks tend to specialize in rural areas. According to Census 
data cited in the FDIC’s 2012 Community Banking Study, 50% of U.S. rural counties lost 
population between 1980 and 2010 (p. 3-8). Where there has been a decline in population 
within rural areas, metro areas have experienced increases in population within the same time 
period. This means that small banks will face more challenge in expansion and replacing key 
personnel to remain competitive.  
The shift in geographic location within the banking sector is also greatly associated 
with changes in the monitoring process for small business loans. Small bank officers have 
more subjective discretion in adjusting a borrower’s score by including elements such as the 
impression of management quality, personal assessments of collateral value, own views of 
firm prospects etc. (Agarwal & Hauswald, 2010, p. 2763). As mentioned, however, large 
bank loan officers do not have this type of discretion and borrowers are subject to inflexible 
statistical ratings that large banks tend to overuse in order to speed up the lending process and 
increase volume.  
Large banks typically have more branches that are more geographically dispersed 
than do smaller banks. As an organization increases in size and geographic extent, it becomes 
more difficult for the top management to monitor the behavior of employees, and agency 
problems arise. To maintain control over the whole organization, large banks must establish 
procedures that will be followed throughout the whole organization (Cole et al, 2004, p. 229). 
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This has led to cut-and-dry lending methods that have strict procedures in accepting or 
rejection a loan. In other words, if a small business owner does not conform to the bank’s 
rigid monitoring regime, it simply will not be approved for the loan. Having strict cut-offs 
will increase the chances for type II errors. Notwithstanding, large banks can in fact use the 
technology to increase the supply of cheaper SBL at a faster rate than small banks. Agarwal 
and Hauswald (2010) find that as distance increases between borrowers and lenders, the rate 
charged on loans decrease but the availability of credit tends to decrease as well (p. 2758). It 
is through this channel distance plays a significant role in increasing loans to small businesses 
but this may exclude loans to marginally-risked businesses or certain SBL demanders.  
3.3 Expectations 
Ongoing consolidation has created a paradigm shift in the sense of supply vs. demand for 
small business loans. Not all consolidation is homogenous, however. As pointed out in 
previous sections, most mergers occur between two small banks but a significant portion of 
these mergers are accredited to large banks between $1 billion and $10 billion in assets. As 
established, there are vast differences in certain variables in monitoring for SBL between 
large and small banks. Consequently, I expect there to be significant differences in the 
changes in SBL between the two forms of mergers.  
Hypothesis (1): The magnitude of changes in small business lending (including 30-89 
day delinquencies) between large bank and small bank acquirers following a merger 
significantly differs. 
SBCS-technology enables large banks to lend more to marginally-risked businesses 
compared to what would be lent in absence of the technology because assigned ratings allow 
for risk-based lending. Other objectives also encourage increased lending to these businesses 
such as lower transaction costs and faster approvals. With faster loan acceptance comes 
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higher loan volume. The increase in lending spurred by these objectives should create 
diversity in the SBL portfolio which could hedge against possible risk exposure. Succinctly, 
in theory, SBCS objectives work harmoniously to increase SBL to all types of borrowers. It is 
important to study the effect of mergers in relation to SBCS objectives, however. If mergers 
do not exhibit counteractive tendencies to these objectives, small business lending among all 
categories and value ranges, as well as delinquencies should increase following mergers 
involving large bank acquirers. This should be especially true if the acquired small banks’ 
lending portfolios presented relatively higher numbers in these areas.  
Credit scoring systems are designed to more accurately predict serious delinquencies 
(>89 days) and make lending to opaque businesses more efficient because of lower 
transaction costs associated with the monitoring process and the enhanced ability to lend 
more to marginally-risked small businesses (Hasumi et al, 2012, p. 9). If large banks truly use 
SBCS technology to lend more to marginally-risked small businesses, under the ontological 
assumption that these businesses will face difficulty in always making timely payments, we 
should observe an increase in post-merger 30-89 day delinquencies if large banks do not drop 
these businesses from the former small bank’s portfolio following the change in ownership. 
Despite this, however, as large banks continue to gain market share and in light of recent 
findings such as in Quittner (2013) that may suggest increases in SBL may not be equally 
distributed, I expect after merger delinquencies to decrease following a merger with a large 
bank acquirer.  
Small banks are keen to take extra steps to extend loans to “spotty” applicants if key 
concepts are strong (Moran, 2011). Especially compared to large banks that are known for 
their strict lending practices, small banks specialize in a more customer-focused fashion and 
are more willing to lend the extra dollar to relatively marginally-risked small businesses 
because they do not rely on such a fine-line system to accept or reject loans. Comparatively, I 
38 
 
expect small banks to have higher average delinquencies than large banks before the merger. 
Following a merger, however, even though I anticipate that small bank 30-89 day 
delinquencies will rise and large bank delinquencies will fall (hypotheses 2 & 3), I cannot 
predict the direction or significance of change in 30-89 day delinquencies in jointly 
comparing the differences between the two subgroups (hypothesis 1). 
Hypothesis (2): 30-89 day delinquencies experience a significant decrease when a large 
bank acquires a small bank. 
Hypothesis (3): 30-89 day delinquencies experience a significant increase when a small 
bank acquires another small bank. 
In regards to the fourth hypothesis, large banks not involved in a merger should experience 
no significant change in small business lending.  
Hypothesis (4): There will be no significant changes in small business lending among 
similar non-acquirer banks within the same time frame as acquirer banks.  
The stated hypotheses above will be tested by implementing two different approaches: 
(1) comparing the post-merger acquirer to itself before a merger (single-entity perspective); 
and (2) using the separate-entity perspective in comparing changes between the two acquiring 
bank subsets. In addition, concerning hypotheses 1 & 4, each category (e.g., CRE, C&I, farm 
and agriculture) as well as each loan value range (e.g., <$100K, $100K-$250K, and $250K-
$1,000K) will be tested for marked differences. For delinquencies, since very few banks in 
my data sets reported delinquencies for other agricultural loans only CRE, C&I, and Farm 
loans will be represented.  
  
39 
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
1. Description of Research Design and Sources of Data 
The backbone diagram in figure 5 illustrates the process flow of this research. I first surveyed 
existing literature for possible areas that could be discussed further by presenting more detail 
dealing with small businesses and loans. After less explored areas were discovered I then 
moved on to analyze literature covering this topic to gain more insight into existing 
methodologies and to search for possible distinguishing areas to which I could create a new 
approach. Once this was established, I collected data from governmental sources and 
analyzed the data sets with both descriptive and inferential statistics. After the analysis I 
checked the results against my hypotheses and results of past literature to discuss possible 
public policy concerns. Lastly, in the conclusion, I reflect on objectives and offer a possible 
way to address the issues. 
Large commercial banks generally have greater capacity to quickly monitor for the 
risks associated with loans at relatively lower costs. The continued pressure makes it 
increasingly difficult for smaller banks to compete. Many advocates for bank consolidation 
and proponents of decreasing the number of banks contend that these mergers do not 
negatively impact small business lending. They go even further to proclaim that mergers 
increase post-consolidation lending. These standpoints may be stemmed from the assertions 
that large banks can tailor to small business needs more so than small banks. Comfort has 
also been created due to other research claiming that even if small businesses were dropped 
as a result of a merger these businesses would be scooped up by other small banks or 
alternative lenders in the community. The latter assertion was partially discussed in Trends 
and Performance in the Banking Sector in discussion of bank approval rates. Other studies 
such as Peek and Rosengren (1996, 1998) find that, unlike in small bank mergers, when a 
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large bank acquires a small bank, the target’s small business lending tends to decline. 
Empirical research covering whether remaining small banks pick up potentially dropped 
marginally-risked small businesses is out of the scope of this research, but insight on this 
topic as well as empirical analysis on other effects of mergers will be covered. The 
methodology used to accomplish this is described in this chapter. This work challenges 
previous findings from existing literature by implementing data sets that will account for the 
possible shift in distributions of lenders (as discussed in the Pitfalls section), by using recent 
mergers (2010-2012) following the 2007-08 economic recession. Using a data set that 
includes both large and small acquirers, I compare the possible aggregate effects on small 
businesses that have different borrowing needs and financial positions. By covering mergers 
over a three year time span I will be able to confirm which findings have more dominance 
following recent mergers. More so than past studies, recent data will also account for fuller 
SBCS market saturation as it is used more dominantly by larger banks in assessing small 
businesses. Mergers that have taken place were retrieved from merger records presented in 
the FDIC’s annual report to congress regarding merger decisions. 
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This study starts from 2010 due to new regulations requiring all banks to disclose 
SBL loan data in Schedule RC-C Part II Loans to Small Businesses and Small Farms for each 
quarter. Prior to 2010, banks with total assets less than $1 billion were not required to 
disclose this information making it difficult to observe effects on small business lending 
following a merger. Having 2010 as a starting point allows me to use the most recent bank 
data preceding the merger and to more accurately create a time frame for study. The FDIC’s 
annual report to congress shows the records of regular mergers, corporate reorganizations and 
failed banks. The reports also include important information regarding the merger such as the 
name and total assets of the acquirer and acquired bank, the value of assets acquired, date of 
acquisition, and location of the acquired bank and respective FDIC numbers. In all three 
sections the report includes all mergers that occurred within the year regardless of the size of 
the acquirer or acquiree. In each year, the starting number of listed mergers were quite high 
but were narrowed down to only viable observations.  
Many listed mergers on the report were not full mergers and several banks remained 
active. Certain patterns were established for the elimination of these instances. For large bank 
acquirers, if the acquired bank listed had $60 million or lower in assets the bank was 
considered still active. For small bank acquirers, if listed assets acquired were $30 million or 
less the bank was considered still active. This process of elimination was used to omit 
unqualified observations because of practicality reasons regarding time. I did, however, 
randomly check several of these to verify the assumption and that the pattern remained viable. 
Among the three reports there were 283, 267, and 270 originally listed mergers for a total of 
820. This number, however, was inflated due to the fact that many of these institutions 
remained active and were not fully merged.  
The next step was to consolidate these mergers to account for mergers that involved a 
bank that acquired more than one bank in the same year. Each instance fitting this criteria 
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were compiled into a single observation. If a merger involved acquiring two or more different 
banks on different dates, call report data on the acquiring bank for the dates would be 
averaged together to create a single acquiring entity. Further exploration of these cases for 
violations pertaining to the study reduced this number further. Examples of such violations 
include:  cases of acquiring multiple banks with at least one having more than $1 billion in 
assets; cases involving the absence of a SBL portfolio for either the acquirer, acquired, or 
both; and perhaps the strictest condition was cases involving a bank acquiring institutions that 
created an overlap within a one-year time frame.  
The last condition was the most influential in decreasing the sample size. In order to 
account for the effects of mergers using a one year time allotment from the date the merger 
occurred, cases including a prior year merger that would overlap into the current time frame 
of a merger have to be controlled for and therefore were not included. Likewise, observations 
involving a future year merger that would also have some overlap in the same time frame 
were omitted. Only cases that involved acquiring small banks isolated within a one-year time 
frame and had no overlap were used in the study. For simplicity, it was important to have this 
restriction to allow for easier comparison of pre-merger SBL and post-merger SBL and to 
observe real effects in one year following the merger. If this restriction were not in place, it 
would be difficult to measure this effect because overlap would make my methodology 
invalid.6 Most mergers that take place involve acquisition of 1-3 banks and accordingly cases 
in my data samples limit one-year mergers to three for a single bank in a given year. After 
combining mergers into cases, the possible sample size was 194, 168, and 172 for a total of 
534 cases. Of this 534, approximately 199 involved large bank acquirers, 299 involved small 
bank acquirers and the rest involved acquired large banks. Finally, as a result of estimating 
and omitting the mergers including active institutions and combining multiple mergers into a 
                                                          
6 Support for a one-year window is given in Peek and Rosengran (1998, p. 803).  
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single case7 and confirming cases met all the conditions, the final sample size for large-small 
acquisitions was 57 acquirers and 72 acquirees.  
In order to compare the effects of mergers involving large bank acquirers and small 
bank acquirers using statistical procedures that work best with similar sample sizes, I 
collected a similar sample size for small-small acquisitions. In this subset there were 64 
acquirers and 69 acquirees. Also, in order to make comparison reliable as possible, I collected 
the same amount of cases from the different sections with particular importance in the failed 
bank section for both data sets. It is important to note that in some other SBL studies, failed 
banks are not included in the data sets. In this study, however, these cases were included on 
the grounds that both large and small banks bid on these banks. With differences in 
monitoring and SBL policies, if the size of the acquirer really matters SBEs will also be 
affected depending on the size of the winning bidder for failed banks. Studies regarding bank 
performances have reasonable grounds for not including these institutions but for the sake of 
measuring changes in SBL, I have warranted it is important to also include these in the data 
set.  
Since the determination of the sample size has been established, the latter sections 
will cover more details in the methodology. Using the FDIC website’s summary of deposits, I 
first looked up listed acquisitions’ acquiring banks’ information to confirm all acquisition 
information such as the date, whether it is no longer active, and to ensure the existence of 
pre-merger lending to small businesses for both the acquirer and the acquiree. Next, I would 
go through each one of the conditions to ensure its validity. Once validated, I would 
download the latest call report preceding the merger for the acquired institution as well as the 
call report for the acquiring institution for the same date. If there were multiple acquired 
banks those banks’ same date call reports were also downloaded. Then for the same quarter 
                                                          
7 Combining multiple mergers into one case is observed in Peek and Rosengran (1998, p. 806). 
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of the following year the call report for the acquiring institution would be downloaded to 
allow observation of possible changes in lending and delinquencies by utilizing both 
descriptive and inferential statistics using IBM’s SPSS®. Call reports were collected from the 
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council’s (FFIEC) website. 
There are three major directions of this research. The first is to note key differences in 
lending between banks with less than $1 billion in assets compared to commercial banks with 
assets between $1 billion and $10 billion. My data sets will allow comparison analysis for 
both small and large bank SBL. Comparison will cover how each one tends to lend to small 
businesses as well as differences in delinquencies. The second major direction will compare 
the different merger effects as a result of large acquirers to those of small acquirers. Doing so 
will make it possible to confirm whether findings from large acquirers are unique and 
actually present a possible policy issue; especially since these mergers accounted for nearly 
40% of the mergers from 2010 to 2012. The final direction will compare changes in small 
business lending for large acquirers to those of similar large banks that were not involved in a 
merger in the same time frame as the matching acquiring banks. In this data set, I was only 
able to find 32 cases of similar large banks conforming to the necessary conditions. Due to 
this dataset being half the size, certain findings may vary from the larger large-small 
acquisition dataset. However, findings should be approximately the same and meaningful 
information can still be drawn from the comparison to other similar large banks that were not 
active in acquiring other institutions.   
2. Description of Data Analysis 
The first direction of this research is quite straightforward and will be accomplished through 
several tables highlighting descriptives of the data set. The remaining directions to reach 
established objectives will use a different approach as well as include empirical analysis. To 
my knowledge, extant literature mainly discusses effects on small businesses as a whole 
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without placing much emphasis on differences that may arise in different value and volume 
ranges of lending within each loan type and how these changes may collectively affect 
different demands for small business loans. There is not much evidence to support that 
moderately-risked small businesses have also experienced easier access to funds. It is key to 
note here that like other research this research too implements a single-entity approach where 
the pre-merger acquiring bank’s SBL is compared to the same bank’s SBL following the 
merger but this research also includes comparison using a separate-entity basis8 where two 
separate entities exist prior to the merger in explaining the difference in effects between 
large-small acquisitions and small-small acquisitions. As illustrated in Chapter II, much 
existing literature already finds that commercial banks are often able to increase their SBL 
portfolio after acquiring small banks. After reading several journals noting this I wanted to 
analyze the SBL environment from a slightly different angle taking into consideration the 
small business lending occupied by the target bank. In order to accomplish this, I used an 
average lending approach to account for the average lending both the acquirer and the 
acquired (separate entities) were lending together compared to the average lending of the 
acquirer post-merger. Both volume and value figures were often highly positively skewed. 
Skewness makes it more difficult to represent the population when using an average approach 
so to deal with the extreme values I transformed the data. For loan volume I used the square-
root transformation—a common technique to handle positively skewed count data. For loan 
value, I used the log transformation—another well-known tool for positively skewed 
monetary variables such as sales. After transformation I used SPSS® to process the data. 
After the means were generated for SBL from both entities before the merger and SBL from 
the single entity after the merger, I back-transformed the data to original numbers to then 
calculate the differences in lending based on the sum of the averages for both entities 
                                                          
8 A similar separate-entity method was used in Strahan and Weston (1996, p. 3) in assessing SBL before and 
after a merger.  
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compared to the averages of the post-merger entity. These changes were broken down into 
four loan categories (CRE, C&I, Farm, and other Agricultural) as well as changes on a total 
basis. In each category, volume and value changes in raw numbers along with percentages are 
presented for easy comparison between the two merger types. In terms of inferential statistics, 
non-parametric t-tests 9  were used to assess whether significant changes exist comparing 
acquiring institutions before the merger to itself after the merger as well a t-test testing for 
major differences between the two merger types on the separate entity basis. This way allows 
for more insight into possible public policy concerns. 
The final avenue will also be mainly accomplished through inferential analysis. By 
pooling commercial banks that have engaged in an acquisition together with similar banks 
that were not, I expect to be able to assess whether a merger significantly impacts post-
merger SBL compared to other large banks. Commercial banks that acquired a small bank 
will be paired with similar commercial banks that were not involved in a merger but 
nonetheless operate in the same state and are fairly the same size. By using the FDIC bank 
lookup feature I was able to view all the banks operating in a given state. I have paired these 
banks based on pre-merger total assets due to a high correlation between assets and business 
loans (including SBL). Similar-sized banks with main operations in the same state should 
make it possible to isolate and analyze the impact of mergers with greater efficiency. Tables 
illustrating descriptives, correlations, and p-values will be presented in the Results chapter 
when necessary. 
                                                          
9 The two statistical tests that were used in this research was the Mann-Whitney U-test and the Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranks test, both for non-parametric data. For comparison between small banks and large banks, the 
Mann-Whitney U-test was used. When comparing changes in one data set over a one-year time horizon, the 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test was used. To calculate correlations, I used Spearman’s Rho for n-par data. 
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3. Limitations  
Certain limitations exist within the methodology. The first limitation is that bank information 
from call reports is on a consolidated basis which makes it impossible to narrow the focus to 
the specific location where small banks were acquired. Nonetheless, capturing information on 
a consolidated basis still enables discussion on small business lending on an aggregate scale 
which effects all small businesses regardless of location. The overall tone of this research is 
to study the effects of mergers on an aggregate basis so consolidated data is fitting. The next 
limitation deals with delinquency data. It is necessary to consider other possible explanations 
for the outcomes spurred by data being on a consolidated basis. It is possible at locations 
where small banks were acquired marginally-risked loans and therefore the delinquency ratio 
increased but elsewhere there was an offset due to lower delinquencies. However, this 
problem too should not present a significant issue because even on an aggregate basis if large 
banks have not changed its small business lending policies the ratio of 30-89 day 
delinquencies to total loans before the merger and after the merger should remain relatively 
unchanged. In addition, delinquencies presented in Call Reports are not divided into SBL and 
other business loans. Therefore, it is possible that certain observed changes are not entirely 
owed to small businesses, but other studies have also been conducted under this limitation. It 
should be safe to assume that changes in these figures could still be partially associated with 
small business loans as given figures include delinquencies from SBL. Another limitation 
deals with the time period over which SBL is being measured. I have chosen a one-year time 
window based on past literature and because of the choice to use recent data. Using recent 
data only allows me to measure changes over a one-year period because a two-year period 
would push some 2012 mergers into December of 2014 making it impossible to measure 
changes. The final limitation deals with whether banks in the sample are in fact using SBCS 
technology. Berger et al (2011) wrote that “today…anecdotal evidence suggests that the vast 
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majority of large banks use SBCS” (p. 2). Mergers included in my data set start from 2010 
and run until 2012; thus, it is reasonable to assume large banks in my data set—albeit they are 
not the largest large banks—are implementing the technology especially since they are active 
in SBL. 
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IV. RESULTS 
Table 2 shows average loan volume and value, as well as the average total assets and loans 
for the small banks acquired by large banks and table 3 shows the same for small banks 
acquired by other small banks. It is easily observed that small banks have less volume and 
value of SBL in terms of absolute values, but as a percent of total assets and loans, they lend 
more. Referring to table 2 and table 4, acquired small banks lend 13% and 20%--which are 
approximately the same as acquiring small banks; whereas, pre-merger large banks lend 
around 10% of assets and 15.5% of business loans to small businesses. There is not much 
difference in these figures, however. I expected acquired small bank percentages to be 
significantly higher than acquiring large banks. This shows that large banks between $1 
billion and $10 billion still lend quite a bit to small businesses.  
Larger percentages are observed when a small bank is acquired by another small bank. 
These banks are around half the size of the small banks acquired by large banks and lend 
more in terms of assets and total business loans accordingly with nearly 15.6% of assets and 
24.6% of business loans going out to small businesses. These tables are also broken down 
into each loan type where absolute numbers and percentages are shown. For both acquired 
small bank data sets CRE loans have the same level of volume which was around 28%. The 
other three sections of lending however vary between the two, which illustrates that among 
all banks, regardless of initial size, SBL has a tendency to change as banks become larger. 
Major differences exist in C&I loans and Other Agricultural loans. C&I loans for larger small 
banks acquired by large banks assumed slightly over 50% of the total volume of loans while 
at smaller small banks acquired by other small banks C&I loans accounted for approximately 
37%. In the opposite direction, smaller small banks lent out a quarter of its volume to Other 
Agricultural loans while the larger small banks had around 12% designated to this loan type. 
However, from table 6, acquiring small banks also had a high percentage of loans for Other 
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Agricultural purposes, which suggests although there is a tendency to shift away from certain 
loan types to others, it is not guaranteed. Interestingly, in both large-small acquisitions and 
small-small acquisitions it appears to be important to acquire banks that are similar in both 
volume and value structure (i.e., similar lending policy as to which type of loans are being 
extended). At any rate, consistent with existing knowledge concerning small banks and large 
banks, tables 2, 3, and 6 show that small banks lend out a larger portion of their assets and 
total business loans than large banks. In terms of actual volume and value, however, large 
banks have more resources and a larger customer base which allows them to lend more. 
Comparing figures in table 4 and table 6, large acquirers in my data set tend to lend relatively 
more CRE and C&I loans where small acquirers tend to lend relatively more for Farm and 
Other Agricultural purposes. This is consistent with the geographical differences discussed in 
Section 3.2.3 Geographical Considerations that small banks have a tendency to operate 
branches in rural areas and large banks tend to operate branches in metro areas.  
 
 
<$100K $100K-$250K $250K-$1,000K % Total
17 25 44 28.25%
111 24 19 51.10%
14 8 3 8.23%
22 9 6 12.42%
165 66 73 100%
<$100K $100K-$250K $250K-$1,000K % Assets % Loans Average Assets Average Loans
$466.30 $2,766.48 $16,060.81 8.91% 13.86%
$1,671.62 $1,707.74 $2,346.19 2.64% 4.11%
$306.92 $595.46 $506.93 0.65% 1.01%
$200.97 $659.06 $767.81 0.75% 1.17%
$2,645.81 $5,728.73 $19,681.74 12.96% 20.16%
 (,000s)
Commercial Real Estate
Commercial & Industrial
Average Volume
Acquired Small Bank (Large Bank Acquirer)
Average Value (,000s)
Loan Type
Commercial Real 
Estate
Farm
Other Agricultural
Total SBL
Loan Type
Commercial & 
Industrial
Farm
Other Agricultural
Total SBL
$216,473.56 $139,186.55
Table 2. Acquired Small Bank (Large Bank Acquirer) 
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<$100K $100K-$250K $250K-$1,000K % Total
19 20 23 28.33%
56 15 10 36.75%
12 8 5 11.11%
36 9 7 23.81%
123 52 44 100%
<$100K $100K-$250K $250K-$1,000K % Assets % Loans Average Assets Average Loans
$463.31 $1,978.19 $5,779.03 8.31% 13.06%
$1,003.63 $1,073.32 $1,322.98 3.44% 5.40%
$303.69 $657.69 $876.42 1.86% 2.92%
$466.45 $593.84 $933.11 2.02% 3.17%
$2,237.08 $4,303.04 $8,911.54 15.63% 24.56%
Acquired Small Bank (Small Bank Acquirer)
Average Volume
Average Value (,000s)
Loan Type
Total SBL
Commercial & 
Industrial
Farm
Other Agricultural
Loan Type
Total SBL
Commercial Real 
Estate
$98,872.58 $62,923.06
Commercial & Industrial
Farm
Other Agricultural
 (,000s)
Commercial Real Estate
Table 3. cquired Sm ll Bank (Small Bank 
Acquirer) 
<$100K $100K-$250K $250K-$1,000K % Total
143 205 313 30.07%
773 207 191 53.21%
66 47 25 6.31%
146 50 34 10.41%
1,128 509 563 100%
<$100K $100K-$250K $250K-$1,000K % Assets % Loans Average Assets Average Loans
$4,526.90 $23,079.69 $112,724.73 6.38% 9.59%
$14,551.17 $16,494.44 $40,606.09 3.26% 4.89%
$1,348.00 $2,988.50 $3,772.50 0.37% 0.55%
$1,390.76 $2,402.09 $2,972.51 0.31% 0.46%
$21,816.83 $44,964.72 $160,075.83 10.31% 15.50%
Total SBL
Average Volume (,000s)
 (,000s)
Pre-Merger Large Bank
Loan Type
Commercial Real Estate
Commercial & Industrial
Farm
Other Agricultural
Average Value (,000s)
Loan Type
$1,463,782.23$2,200,082.71
Commercial & 
Industrial
Farm
Other Agricultural
Total SBL
Commercial Real 
Estate
Table 4. Pre-Merger Large Bank  
<$100K $100K-$250K $250K-$1,000K % Total
156 230 365 30.00%
924 235 224 55.23%
68 52 26 5.81%
143 47 35 8.95%
1,291 563 651 100%
<$100K $100K-$250K $250K-$1,000K % Assets % Loans Average Assets Average Loans
$5,242.31 $26,328.98 $133,899.92 6.49% 9.79%
$16,419.49 $19,255.94 $48,409.44 3.30% 4.97%
$1,398.34 $3,165.95 $3,648.50 0.32% 0.49%
$1,216.94 $2,201.29 $3,011.76 0.25% 0.38%
$24,277.08 $50,952.15 $188,969.62 10.36% 15.63%
Post-Merger Large Bank
Average Volume (,000s)
 (,000s)
Loan Type
Total SBL
Total SBL
Commercial Real 
Estate
$2,549,461.04 $1,690,398.12
Commercial & 
Industrial
Farm
Other Agricultural
Average Value (,000s)
Loan Type
Commercial Real Estate loans
Commercial & Industrial Loans
Farm
Other Agricultural
*
**
**
**
*** ***
*** ***
*** *** ***
*** ***
***
*, **, *** Indicates significance at .05, .01, .001, respectively.  
Table 5. Post-Merger Large Bank 
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Table 4 and table 5 show the averages relating to the acquiring large banks and SBL. 
Comparing the two illustrates the average changes that occur one year post merger among 
large acquirers. Average assets grew by $349,378.33 and total loans grew by $226,615.89, or 
15.48%. Average SBL grew by $37,341.47, or 16.46%. Since growth in SBL is greater than 
the overall growth in business loans, large banks in my data set appear to utilize the growth in 
assets to increase their lending to small businesses rather than shift to large business lending. 
Overall, however, average loan growth (including SBL) and the ratio of SBL-to-total loans 
percent-change for small banks was higher. The small acquirers’ average loan growth, 
average SBL growth, and SBL-to-total loans percent-change was $77,944.10 (39.48%), 
$22,200.64 (53.48%), and 28.48%, respectively. As these figures show, small acquirers 
utilize the acquisition at a higher magnitude to benefit small businesses compared to large 
bank acquirers. Furthermore, even though the small banks acquired by small banks are 
smaller in size, small acquirers’ increase in SBL does not lag much behind the increases for 
large bank acquirers. Table 7 reiterates the changes in SBL relative to total loans among large 
and small acquirers discussed above. The following sections will discuss changes in each 
loan type more in detail with a combination of descriptive and inferential statistics.  
<$100K $100K-$250K $250K-$1,000K % Total
35 40 54 23.62%
167 38 32 43.16%
24 18 10 9.65%
95 21 13 23.57%
321 117 109 100%
<$100K $100K-$250K $250K-$1,000K % Assets % Loans Average Assets Average Loans
$852.01 $4,053.65 $14,804.95 6.40% 9.98%
$2,846.12 $3,115.30 $7,094.53 4.24% 6.61%
$600.44 $1,369.64 $2,132.16 1.33% 2.08%
$1,099.51 $1,365.07 $2,181.90 1.51% 2.35%
$5,398.08 $9,903.67 $26,213.54 13.48% 21.03%
Commercial & Industrial
Farm
Other Agricultural
Pre-Merger Small Bank Acquirer
Average Volume
Average Value (,000s)
Loan Type
Commercial & 
Industrial
Farm
Other Agricultural
Loan Type
Total SBL
Total SBL
Commercial Real 
Estate
$308,052.81 $197,430.06
 (,000s)
Commercial Real Estate
Table 6. Pre-Merger Small Bank Acquirer 
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1. Commercial Real Estate Loans 
Comparing figures from table 4 and 5, average large bank loan volume in the first value 
range increased from 143 to 156, the second value range 205 to 230, and the largest value 
range 313 to 365. Average loan values for the first range increased from $4.5 million to $5.2 
million, loans in the second value range increased from $23.1 million to $26.3 million, and 
loans in the highest range increased from $112.7 million to $133.9 million.10Table 5 also 
shows from a statistical standpoint whether changes in volume and value using the single-
entity approach were significant. There were significant changes in all value ranges for both 
volume and value of SBL for large bank acquirers. In the less than $100K value range both 
volume and value change was significant at the .01 level. The other two value ranges for both 
volume and value were significant at the .001 level.  
Results for post-merger small bank acquirers are found in table 8. Change in average 
loan volume in the first value range was from 35 to 54, the second range 40 to 60, and the 
largest range 54 to 80. Change in loan value for the ranges was from $852,000 to $1.6 million, 
$4.1 million to $6.7 million, and $14.8 million to $23.9 million, respectively. Statistically 
speaking, at the .001 confidence level increases in both volume and value for all value ranges 
were significant. 
                                                          
10 These figures are approximate. See appropriate tables for exact values. 
Bank
$226,615.89 $37,341.47
15.48% 16.46%
$77,944.10 $22,200.64
39.48% 53.48%
SBL Growth vs. TL Growth
28.48%Community 
Avg. Loan Growth
Average SBL 
Growth
Commercial
SBL/TL
16.48%
Table 7. SBL Growth vs. TL Growth 
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 Table 9 shows before and after amounts for SBL volume and value and the percent 
change from the pre-merger period to the post-merger period for both large and small bank 
acquirers. This table, however, also shows how the effects differ between the two merger 
types from a statistical standpoint. The most obvious finding is that SBL for small banks, in 
terms of percentage, increases much more than large bank SBL. This is perhaps explained by 
the lower amount of SBL before the merger as the new assets from acquired small banks 
represent a higher percentage of the small bank SBL portfolio than it does for the large banks 
in the data set. One of the key changes observed from this within CRE loans was the 
magnitude of increase for each value range for each merger type. Among large-small bank 
mergers, the highest increases in terms of percent was for the largest value loans for both 
volume and value. Among small-small mergers, however, the highest increase in terms of 
percent was for the smallest value loans. Statistically, the only significant differences found 
for CRE loans between the two data sets were in the uppermost value ranges for both volume 
(p = -.001) and value (p = -.007) where large banks’ SBL experience higher increases. 
Therefore, it appears that large banks may have a tendency to increase lending to lenders who 
demand higher value loans within this loan category.  
When using the separate-entity approach percent-increases vary from the single-entity 
approach, but changes in percent were similar for both acquirers following this approach. For 
large bank acquirers, in terms of volume, only the largest value range experienced increases 
above 1%. In terms of value, surprisingly the greatest increase was observed in the lowest 
value range. For small bank acquirers, in terms of volume, the largest value range was the 
only range that experienced an increase above 1%. In terms of value, small banks too 
experienced the largest increase in the first value range. Table 10 shows these findings along 
with how the effects differ from a statistical standpoint while using the separate-entity 
approach. Increases in SBL are not as drastic when using the separate-entity approach 
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because the measures take into account both banks’ lending before the merger. The degree of 
change is much less and is more accurate in determining true increases in lending. Value 
increases in terms of percent are still higher for small banks but from the t-test column 
differences in increase between the two data sets in all size ranges are not significant even at 
the .10 level. There was a significant difference (p = .05) found in the middle value range of 
lending in terms of volume, however. 
Under the single-entity approach, I had to accept the null hypothesis that differences 
were not significant for the first two value ranges for both volume and value. For the third 
value range, I rejected the null and accepted the alternative. Under the separate-entity 
approach, I could only reject the null for the middle value range for changes in volume.   
 
 
<$100K $100K-$250K $250K-$1,000K % Total
54 60 80 26.18%
226 57 45 44.22%
32 25 13 9.36%
111 24 16 20.23%
422 166 153 100%
<$100K $100K-$250K $250K-$1,000K % Assets % Loans Average Assets Average Loans
$1,605.25 $6,654.32 $23,897.78 7.54% 11.68%
$4,647.62 $5,232.11 $11,087.39 4.92% 7.61%
$806.26 $1,944.94 $2,816.35 1.31% 2.02%
$1,280.18 $1,307.45 $2,436.28 1.18% 1.82%
$8,339.31 $15,138.82 $40,237.80 14.94% 23.14%
Loan Type
Average Value (,000s)
Total SBL
Average Volume
Loan Type
Commercial Real Estate loans
Total SBL
Post-Merger Small Bank Acquirer
 (,000s)
Farm
Other Agricultural
Commercial Real 
Estate
$426,357.48 $275,374.16
Commercial & 
Industrial
Farm
Other Agricultural
Commercial & Industrial Loans
***
*** ***
*** *** ***
***
***
*** ***
****** ***
****** ***
****** ***
****** ***
***
*, **, *** Indicates significance at .05, .01, .001, respectively.  
Table 8. Post-Merger Small Bank Acquirer 
57 
 
2. Commercial and Industrial Loans 
Comparing figures from table 4 and table 5, average large bank loan volume in the first value 
range increased from 773 to 924, the second value range 207 to 235, and the largest value 
range 191 to 224. Average loan values for the first range increased from $14.6 million to 
$16.4 million, loans in the second value range increased from $16.5 million to $19.3 million, 
and loans in the highest range increased from $40.6 million to $48.4 million.11 Table 5 also 
shows from a statistical standpoint whether changes in volume and value using the single-
entity approach were significant. There were significant changes in all value ranges for both 
volume and value of SBL for large bank acquirers. Changes in volume were significant at 
                                                          
11 These figures are approximate. See appropriate tables for exact values. 
***, **** Significant at .01, .001, respectively.  
BM AM % BM AM %
Loan Value SBL SBL Change SBL SBL Change
Volume Average Average Average Average
<$100K 143 156 8.91% 35 54 55.87%
$100K-$250K 205 230 12.15% 40 60 49.29%
$250K-$1,000K 313 365 16.76% 54 80 46.95%
Value Average Average Average Average
<$100K $4,526.90 $5,242.31 15.80% $852.01 $1,605.25 88.41%
$100K-$250K $23,079.69 $26,328.98 14.08% $4,053.65 $6,654.32 64.16%
$250K-$1,000K $112,724.73 $133,899.92 18.78% $14,804.95 $23,897.78 61.42%
CRE Loans Single Entity Changes Comparison
Large-Small Merger Type Small-Small Merger Type
Diff-Diff 
0.676
-0.007***
t-test
0.294
0.722
-0.001****
0.919
Table 9. CRE Loans Single-Entity Changes Comparison 
** Significant at .05 
BM AM % BM AM %
Loan Value Sep. Entity Large Change Sep. Entity Small Change
Volume Average Average Average Average
<$100K 160 156 -2.64% 54 54 0.62%
$100K-$250K 230 230 0.01% 60 60 0.49%
$250K-$1,000K 357 365 2.43% 78 80 2.53%
Value Average Average Average Average
<$100K $4,993.20 $5,242.31 4.99% $1,315.32 $1,605.25 22.04%
$100K-$250K $25,846.17 $26,328.98 1.87% $6,031.85 $6,654.32 10.32%
$250K-$1,000K $128,785.54 $133,899.92 3.97% $20,583.98 $23,897.78 16.10%
CRE Loans Separate Entity Changes Comparison
0.366
0.112
0.207
Diff-Diff 
t-test
Large-Small Merger Type Small-Small Merger Type
0.454
0.040**
0.448
Table 10. CRE Loans Separate-Entity Changes Comparison 
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the .001 level for all value ranges. In the less than $100K value range, value change was 
significant at the .01 level, but the other value ranges were significant at the .001 level.  
Results for post-merger small bank acquirers are found in table 8. Change in average 
loan volume in the first value range was from 167 to 226, the second range 38 to 57, and the 
largest range 32 to 45. Change in loan value for the ranges was from $2.8 million to $4.6 
million, $3.1 million to $5.2 million, and $7.1 million to $11.1 million, respectively. 
Statistically speaking, as with CRE loans, at the .001 confidence level increases in both 
volume and value for all value ranges were significant. 
Table 11 shows the results from using the single-entity approach to compare the 
changes in SBL between the two merger types. As with CRE loans, increases in terms of 
percent are much higher for small bank acquirers. However, percent-increases differ from 
CRE loan findings. Among large bank acquirers, the largest increase in volume was for loans 
less than $100K and in terms of value, loans between $250K and $1,000K experienced the 
largest increase. For small bank acquirers, the largest increase in volume and value was for 
the middle value range of lending. Statistically, like in CRE loans, a significant difference in 
effects was found between the two data sets in the largest value range at the .01 level for 
volume and the .10 level for value where large banks increase their lending more.  
The separate-entity approach yields slightly different results again. These changes are 
shown in table 12. Overall increases for both banks are higher in this section of lending. In 
terms of both volume and value, large bank acquirers increase their lending the most in the 
largest value range. For small banks, in terms of volume, the largest increase was observed in 
the middle value range, but in terms of value the highest increase was observed in loans in the 
largest value range. Statistically, there was a significant difference in the change in volume 
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for the middle value range and significant difference in the first value range for changes in 
value. In the other value ranges, no significant differences were observed.  
Under the single-entity approach, I could only reject the null hypothesis and accept 
the alternative that there was a significant difference in the magnitude of SBL changes for the 
largest value range for both volume and value. Other value ranges experienced no significant 
differences between the two subsets. Under the separate-entity approach, I rejected the null 
hypothesis for the middle value range for volume changes and the first value range for value 
changes. Other ranges showed no significant changes.  
 
 
 
 
 
*, *** Significant at .10, .01, respectively.  
BM AM % BM AM %
Loan Value SBL SBL Change SBL SBL Change
Volume Average Average Average Average
<$100K 773 924 19.61% 167 226 35.07%
$100K-$250K 207 235 13.44% 38 57 52.53%
$250K-$1,000K 191 224 17.66% 32 45 41.42%
Value Average Average Average Average
<$100K $14,551.17 $16,419.49 12.84% $2,846.12 $4,647.62 63.30%
$100K-$250K $16,494.44 $19,255.94 16.74% $3,115.30 $5,232.11 67.95%
$250K-$1,000K $40,606.09 $48,409.44 19.22% $7,094.53 $11,087.39 56.28%
C&I Loans Single Entity Changes Comparison
0.349
0.382
-0.005***
0.763
Large-Small Merger Type Small-Small Merger Type
Diff-Diff 
t-test
0.319
-0.058*
Table 11. C&I Loans Single-Entity Changes Comparison 
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3. Farm Loans 
SBL changes in this category are quite different from the above sections. Comparing figures 
from table 4 and table 5, average large bank loan volume in the first value range increased 
from 66 to 68, the second value range 47 to 52, and the largest value range 25 to 26. Average 
loan values for the first range increased from $1.3 million to $1.4 million, loans in the second 
value range increased from $3 million to $3.2 million, and loans in the highest range 
decreased to $3.6 million from $3.8 million.12 Table 5 also shows from a statistical standpoint 
whether changes in volume and value using the single-entity approach were significant. 
There was no significant change in lending volume in the first value range, but there were 
significant changes in volume for the middle and uppermost value ranges at levels of .001 
and .05, respectively. In terms of changes in value, however, there were no significant 
changes.  
Results for post-merger small bank acquirers are found in table 8 and vary from the 
results found from large bank acquirers.  Change in average loan volume in the first value 
range was from 24 to 32, the second range 18 to 25, and the largest range 10 to 13. Change in 
loan value for the ranges was from $600,000 to $806,000, $1.4 million to $1.9 million, and 
                                                          
12 These figures are approximate. See appropriate tables for exact values. 
BM AM % BM AM %
Loan Value Sep. Entity Large Change Sep. Entity Small Change
Volume Average Average Average Average
<$100K 884 924 4.54% 223 226 1.13%
$100K-$250K 231 235 1.51% 52 57 9.58%
$250K-$1,000K 210 224 6.88% 41 45 7.93%
Value Average Average Average Average
<$100K $16,222.78 $16,419.49 1.21% $3,849.75 $4,647.62 20.73%
$100K-$250K $18,202.18 $19,255.94 5.79% $4,188.62 $5,232.11 24.91%
$250K-$1,000K $42,952.28 $48,409.44 12.71% $8,417.51 $11,087.39 31.72% 0.724
C&I Loans Separate Entity Changes Comparison
0.110
0.005***
0.536
0.024**
0.189
Large-Small Merger Type Small-Small Merger Type
Diff-Diff 
t-test
**, *** Significant at .05, .01, respectively.  
Table 12. C&I Loans Separate-Entity Changes Comparison 
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$2.1 million to $2.8 million, respectively. Statistically speaking, as with CRE and C&I loans, 
at the .001 confidence level increases in both volume and value for all value ranges were 
significant.  
Table 13 shows percent-increases for each section using the single-entity approach for 
comparison. Again, increases for small bank acquirers are much higher than large bank 
acquirers. For large banks, the highest increases was observed in the middle section for both 
volume and value. Unlike the CRE and C&I loans, there was a decrease in the highest value 
of lending in terms of value. For small banks, the highest increases in volume and value were 
also observed in the middle section. When comparing the changes between the two subgroups, 
significant differences in volume was found for the lowest value range where small bank 
acquirers increase lending more than large bank acquirers. In terms of marginal increases 
over large bank acquirers in value, small banks increased lending to the lowest and middle 
sections significantly more at the .05 level.  
The next table, table 14, shows results using the separate-entity approach which yields 
completely different results compared to the single-entity approach. For both large and small 
bank acquirers, SBL decreases in terms of both volume and value. For both large bank and 
small bank acquirers, smallest decreases in volume and value were in the middle section of 
lending. Statistically, in almost every section of lending the negative effects to farm loan 
demanders are smallest when the acquirer of their banks is another small bank. Specifically, 
differences in volume were significant at .05 and .10 for the lowest and middle value range, 
respectively. In terms of value, significance was found at the .05, .05, and .10 level for the 
value ranges in ascending order.  
Under the single-entity approach, I could reject the null hypothesis and accept the 
alternative that there was a significant difference in the magnitude of SBL changes for the 
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first value range for volume changes and the first two value ranges for value changes. Under 
the separate-entity approach, except for the largest value range for volume changes, I could 
reject the null hypothesis for all ranges for both volume and value.  
 
 
4. Other Agricultural Loans 
Comparing figures from table 4 and table 5 average large bank loan volume in the first and 
second value range decreased to 143 from 146 and to 47 from 50, but the largest value range 
increased from 34 to 35. Average loan values for the first range decreased to $1.2 million 
from $1.4 million, loans in the second value range decreased to $2.2 million from $2.4 
million, and loans in the highest range only slightly increased from $2.97 million to $3.01 
BM AM % BM AM %
Loan Value SBL SBL Change SBL SBL Change
Volume Average Average Average Average
<$100K 66 68 2.56% 24 32 29.58%
$100K-$250K 47 52 8.63% 18 25 38.05%
$250K-$1,000K 25 26 4.55% 10 13 23.70%
Value Average Average Average Average
<$100K $1,348.00 $1,398.34 3.73% $600.44 $806.26 34.28%
$100K-$250K $2,988.50 $3,165.95 5.94% $1,369.64 $1,944.94 42.00%
$250K-$1,000K $3,772.50 $3,648.50 -3.29% $2,132.16 $2,816.35 32.09%
0.040**
0.028**
0.163
0.031**
0.193
0.561
Diff-Diff 
t-test
Farm Loans Single Entity Changes Comparison
Large-Small Merger Type Small-Small Merger Type
Table 13. Farm Loans Single-Entity Changes Comparison 
BM AM % BM AM %
Loan Value Sep. Entity Large Change Sep. Entity Small Change
Volume Average Average Average Average
<$100K 80 68 -15.64% 36 32 -12.69%
$100K-$250K 55 52 -6.41% 26 25 -4.36%
$250K-$1,000K 28 26 -6.87% 15 13 -13.94%
Value Average Average Average Average
<$100K $1,654.92 $1,398.34 -15.50% $904.13 $806.26 -10.82%
$100K-$250K $3,583.96 $3,165.95 -11.66% $2,027.33 $1,944.94 -4.06%
$250K-$1,000K $4,279.43 $3,648.50 -14.74% $3,008.58 $2,816.35 -6.39%
0.011**
Farm Loans Separate Entity Changes Comparison
Large-Small Merger Type Small-Small Merger Type
Diff-Diff 
0.527
t-test
0.086*
0.018**
0.071*
0.016**
Table 14. Farm Loans Separate-Entity Changes Comparison 
*, ** Significant at .10, .05, respectively.  
** Significant at .05  
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million.13 Table 5 also shows from a statistical standpoint whether changes in volume and 
value using the single-entity approach were significant. Large banks did not have any 
significant changes in any value range in either volume or value.  
Results for post-merger small bank acquirers are found in table 8. Change in average loan 
volume in the first value range was from 95 to 111, the second range 21 to 24, and the largest 
range 13 to 16. Change in loan value for the ranges was from $1.1 million to $1.3 million, 
$1.4 million to $1.3 million, and $2.2 million to $2.4 million, respectively. Statistically 
speaking, as with the other sections of lending, at the .001 confidence level increase in 
volume for all value ranges were significant. In terms of value, all value ranges experienced 
significant increases, but at levels .01, .001, and .10 for the first, second, and third value 
ranges, respectively.  
Table 15 shows the results from using the single-entity approach. As with all other 
sections, in terms of percent small bank acquirers increase their lending compared to what 
they were lending one year before. For large bank acquirers, the only increases in volume and 
value was in the largest value range (2.1% and 1.3%). For small bank acquirers, increase in 
volume for all ranges increased with the highest being to the largest loans. In terms of value, 
the first and third value range increased with the largest increase in the lowest value loans. 
Statistically, changes in all value ranges between the two data sets varied significantly. Small 
banks increase their lending more significant at levels .05, .01, and .10, for the three value 
ranges respectively. In terms of volume, however, considering percent-differences in changes 
of average values, the only significant difference (p = .001) between the two data sets was in 
the middle value range.  
Table 16 shows the results using the separate-entity approach. There were large decreases 
for both large and small bank acquirers with the highest decreases for both volume and value 
                                                          
13 These figures are approximate. See appropriate tables for exact values. 
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being in the middle section for both acquirers. Small bank significant marginal volume 
increases over large bank increases were observed for each value range at the .05, .01, 
and .10 levels for the ranges in ascending order. In terms of value, only the middle section 
experienced significant difference (p = .01).  
Under the single-entity approach, I could reject the null hypothesis and accept the 
alternative that there was a significant difference in the magnitude of SBL changes among 
every value range for volume changes and the middle and largest value range for value 
changes. Under the separate-entity approach, I could reject the null for the middle and largest 
value range for volume changes and only the middle value range for value changes.  
 
 
BM AM % BM AM %
Loan Value SBL SBL Change SBL SBL Change
Volume Average Average Average Average
<$100K 146 143 -1.84% 95 111 17.10%
$100K-$250K 50 47 -5.71% 21 24 10.46%
$250K-$1,000K 34 35 2.10% 13 16 19.53%
Value Average Average Average Average
<$100K $1,390.76 $1,216.94 -12.50% $1,099.51 $1,280.18 16.43%
$100K-$250K $2,402.09 $2,201.29 -8.36% $1,365.07 $1,307.45 -4.22%
$250K-$1,000K $2,972.51 $3,011.76 1.32% $2,181.90 $2,436.28 11.66%
0.001****
0.135
0.036**
0.002***
0.056*
0.114
Other Agricultural Loans Single Entity Changes Comparison
Large-Small Merger Type Small-Small Merger Type
Diff-Diff 
t-test
Table 15. Other Agricultural Loans Single-Entity Changes Comparison 
BM AM % BM AM %
Loan Value Sep. Entity Large Change Sep. Entity Small Change
Volume Average Average Average Average
<$100K 168 143 -14.83% 131 111 -15.37%
$100K-$250K 59 47 -20.21% 31 24 -23.28%
$250K-$1,000K 40 35 -14.24% 20 16 -20.39%
Value Average Average Average Average
<$100K $1,591.73 $1,216.94 -23.55% $1,565.96 $1,280.18 -18.25%
$100K-$250K $3,061.15 $2,201.29 -28.09% $1,958.91 $1,307.45 -33.26%
$250K-$1,000K $3,740.32 $3,011.76 -19.48% $3,115.01 $2,436.28 -21.79%
Other Agricultural Loans Separate Entity Changes Comparison
0.308
0.015**
Large-Small Merger Type Small-Small Merger Type
Diff-Diff 
t-test
0.079*
0.766
0.006***
0.126
Table 16. Other Agricultural Loans Separate-Entity Changes Comparison 
*, **, *** Significant at .05, .01, respectively.  
*, **, ***, **** Significant at .10, .05, .01, .001, respectively.  
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5. Total SBL 
Table 17-1 shows before merger and after merger SBL lending of small banks as a 
percentage of SBL lending by large banks. This table also illustrates the faster rate of growth 
in SBL among small acquirers compared to large acquirers following a merger. In every 
category, the proportion of SBL by small banks relative to the SBL by large banks increased 
following the merger. This also illustrates the propensity for small banks to use newly 
acquired assets of other small banks more efficiently in increasing small business lending. I 
also tested the significance of these results by designating the pre-merger proportion levels 
(i.e., small bank SBL/large bank SBL) as the post-merger expected proportion following the 
merger. In theory, if both large bank acquirers and small bank acquirers utilized new assets 
for SBL similarly there should have been no significant difference between the pre-merger 
proportion and the post-merger proportion. Table 17-2 and table 17-3 show the over (under) 
of actual proportion change relative to the expected change. I did not run the test for each 
loan category, but collectively the post-merger proportion significantly differs (p = .05) from 
the expected proportion assuming the proportion stays the same.  
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<$100K $100K-$250K $250K-$1,000K <$100K $100K-$250K $250K-$1,000K
24.28% 19.67% 17.30% 18.82% 17.56% 13.13%
21.61% 18.22% 16.57% 19.56% 18.89% 17.47%
37.12% 37.77% 41.27% 44.54% 45.83% 56.52%
64.97% 42.98% 38.69% 79.06% 56.83% 73.40%
<$100K $100K-$250K $250K-$1,000K <$100K $100K-$250K $250K-$1,000K
34.75% 26.19% 21.77% 30.62% 25.27% 17.85%
24.40% 24.50% 19.91% 28.31% 27.17% 22.90%
46.90% 48.00% 48.83% 57.66% 61.43% 77.19%
77.50% 50.34% 45.30% 105.20% 59.39% 80.89%
Loan Type
CRE
C&I 
FARM
AGRICULTURAL
Before Merger
After Merger
Volume Value
AGRICULTURAL
Small Bank Lending as a Percent of Large Banks (by loan type and category)
Volume Value
Loan Type
CRE
C&I 
FARM
Table 17-1. Small Bank Lending as a Percent of Large Banks (by loan 
type and category) 
Large Bank 
Actual
Small Bank 
Expected 
Small Bank 
Actual
Over (Under)
Large Bank 
Actual
Small Bank 
Expected 
Small Bank 
Actual
Over 
(Under)
13 3 19 16 152 33 59 26
25 5 20 15 28 5 20 15
52 9 25 16 34 6 13 8
Large Bank
Small Bank 
Expected 
Small Bank 
Actual
Over (Under) Large Bank
Small Bank 
Expected 
Small Bank 
Actual
Over 
(Under)
715 202 753 551 1,868 456 1,802 1,345
3,249 764 2,601 1,837 2,761 495 2,117 1,622
21,175 4,242 9,093 4,851 7,803 2,130 3,993 1,863$250K-$1,000K $250K-$1,000K
Size Size
<$100K <$100K
$100K-$250K $100K-$250K
<$100K
$250K-$1,000K $250K-$1,000K
Value $ (,000s) Value $ (,000s)
$100K-$250K $100K-$250K
<$100K
CRE LOANS C&I LOANS
Change in Volume Volume
Size Size
Table 17-2. Small Bank Expected Changes vs. Actual Changes 
Significance of over (under) was calculated using a nonparametric t-test by grouping all expected changes together and 
comparing them against the actual changes using the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. Z-score = -2.165, p-value (2-tailed) = .03 
Large Bank 
Actual
Small Bank 
Expected 
Small Bank 
Actual
Over (Under)
Large Bank 
Actual
Small Bank 
Expected 
Small Bank 
Actual
Over 
(Under)
2 1 7 7 (3) (2) 16 18
4 2 7 5 (3) (1) 2 3
1 0 2 2 1 0 3 2
Large Bank
Small Bank 
Expected 
Small Bank 
Actual
Over (Under) Large Bank
Small Bank 
Expected 
Small Bank 
Actual
Over 
(Under)
50 20 206 186 (174) (162) 181 342
177 83 575 492 (201) (187) (58) 130
(124) (53) 684 738 39 21 254 234
<$100K <$100K
$100K-$250K $100K-$250K
$250K-$1,000K $250K-$1,000K
$250K-$1,000K $250K-$1,000K
Value $ (,000s) Value $ (,000s)
Size Size
Size Size
<$100K <$100K
$100K-$250K $100K-$250K
FARM LOANS AGRICULTURAL LOANS
Volume Volume
Table 17-3. Small Bank Expected Changes vs. Actual Changes (Cont.) 
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The above test assumed a 1-for-1 change in SBL between large acquirers and small 
acquirers and then tested for a significant difference between actual change and expected 
change. The next table, table 18, shows the total differences in lending before merger and 
after merger for both data sets. It also tests for significant differences in changes in SBL 
between the two sub-groups as it was for each category separately using the single-entity 
approach. It is important to also execute the same analysis on a total basis to see overall 
differences in changes. For large bank acquirers, the highest increases were observed in the 
largest value range for both volume and value. For small bank acquirers, the highest increase 
in volume was in the second value range. In terms of value, percent-increases were quite 
close but the lowest value range experienced the highest increase. Statistically, in terms of 
true-number changes in volume and value, large bank acquirers’ increase in lending for loans 
between $250 million and $1 million was significantly higher than small bank acquirers’ 
increase to this value range at the .001 and .01 level for volume and value, respectively.   
Table 19 presents average total loan volume and value for each value range using the 
separate-entity approach. This table combines all loan categories into one and then runs the 
test using a single data set for both large and small acquirers. BM Sep. Entity represents the 
average total lending both the acquiree and the acquirer were lending before the merger by 
summing each bank’s lending together. AM Large represents average post-merger lending by 
large acquirers and AM Small represents average post-merger lending by small acquirers. 
The % Change column represents the percent change in lending by setting the difference in 
lending as a fraction of what both entities were lending before the merger as it was calculated 
for each category on an individual basis. As it was for each separate category, percent-
increase was highest for small bank acquirers. Statistically, in the lowest and middle value 
range on a separate entity basis,  
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there were significantly higher increases in lending when the acquirer is another small bank. 
In the largest value range where large bank acquirer increases over separate-entity SBL may 
be expected to be significantly higher than small bank acquirer increases over separate-entity 
SBL there was no such significant difference in either volume (p = 0.159) or value (p = 
0.217). The total number of loans decreased in all three value ranges for small banks while 
loan value increased for all ranges which may signal a shift in policy where fewer loans are 
extended but are of greater value. From the table it appears there is a shift in policy for large 
banks toward uppermost value lending. In terms of both volume and value, only the third 
section increased while the first two sections remained roughly stagnant.  
BM AM % BM AM %
Loan Value SBL SBL Change SBL SBL Change
Volume Average Average Average Average
<$100K 1,128 1,291 14.49% 321 422 31.61%
$100K-$250K 509 563 10.60% 117 166 41.55%
$250K-$1,000K 563 651 15.63% 109 153 39.85%
Value Average Average Average Average
<$100K $21,816.83 $24,277.08 11.28% $5,398.08 $8,339.31 54.49%
$100K-$250K $44,964.72 $50,952.15 13.32% $9,903.67 $15,138.82 52.86%
$250K-$1,000K $160,075.83 $188,969.62 18.05% $26,213.54 $40,237.80 53.50%
0.992
0.827
-0.003***
Diff-Diff 
t-test
0.595
0.791
-0.000****
Total SBL Single Entity Changes Comparison
Large-Small Merger Type Small-Small Merger Type
Table 18. Total SBL Single-Entity Changes Comparison 
BM AM % BM AM %
Loan Value Sep. Entity Large Change Sep. Entity Small Change
Volume Average Average Average Average
<$100K 1,293 1,291 -0.12% 444 422 -4.93%
$100K-$250K 575 563 -2.07% 169 166 -1.75%
$250K-$1,000K 635 651 2.43% 154 153 -0.55%
Value Average Average Average Average
<$100K $24,462.64 $24,277.08 -0.76% $7,635.16 $8,339.31 9.22%
$100K-$250K $50,693.45 $50,952.15 0.51% $14,206.71 $15,138.82 6.56%
$250K-$1,000K $179,757.57 $188,969.62 5.12% $35,125.08 $40,237.80 14.56%
0.051*
0.217
Total SBL Separate Entity Changes Comparison
Large-Small Merger Type Small-Small Merger Type
Diff-Diff 
t-test
0.069*
0.003***
0.159
0.052*
Table 19. Total SBL Separate-Entity Changes Comparison 
***, **** Significant at .01, .001, respectively.  
*, *** Significant at .10, .01, respectively.  
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 Under the single-entity approach, I could only reject the null hypothesis and accept 
the alternative that there was a significant difference in the magnitude of SBL changes for the 
largest value ranges for volume and value changes. Under the separate-entity approach, I 
could reject the null for the first and second value ranges for both volume and value changes.  
6. Delinquencies  
In almost half of the cases (47%) involving a large bank acquirer, total 30-89 day 
delinquencies decreased following a merger comparing pre-merger acquirer amounts to post-
merger amounts. In small bank acquirer cases, only 30% decreased total delinquencies 
following the merger. It is important to consider what the delinquencies were for acquiring 
banks preceding mergers and compare these figures to post-merger delinquency amounts a 
year later to get a sense of whether these banks cleanse the acquired portfolio of riskier 
borrowers. 14  In theory, if delinquencies significantly drop following a merger it could 
represent a situation where the acquirer essentially scoops the better performing loans from 
the acquired bank and drops the rest. The assumption is that in a one year time span and since 
the acquiring bank increases its assets and total business lending (including SBL), 
delinquencies should not be consistently lower if marginally-risked small business borrowers 
are retained in the lending portfolio. In contrast, since large banks acquire the smaller banks’ 
loans too as a result of a merger, delinquencies, should actually increase.  
Table 20 highlights the increase or decrease in delinquencies for each loan type for 
mergers with a large bank acquirer. On average, in each section, acquired small banks had 
consistently higher delinquencies than large banks as a percent of total business loans. This 
                                                          
14 As it has been mentioned in Limitations, there was no way to isolate specific lending and delinquencies to a 
single bank due to the consolidated source of data. Nonetheless, it still appears that the consolidation between 
the two banks one year later results in fewer loans to moderately-risked businesses, hence fewer delinquencies 
spurred by lending to the more financially sound.  
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supports my expectation that small banks take greater steps to lend more to marginally-risked 
SBEs and is also consistent with extant literature discussing commercial banks’ inclination to 
use SBCS technology strictly in approving loan applicants. In terms of the ratio of 
delinquencies to total business loans, on average these mergers show a slight drop in 
commercial real estate loans and stagnation in both commercial and industrial loans and farm 
loans. From a statistical standpoint using the single-entity approach, there were no significant 
differences in after merger large bank delinquencies compared to before merger large bank 
numbers for large banks. Table 21 shows the results for small bank acquirers. CRE loan 
delinquencies showed an 11% increase, C&I loans showed an 8% decrease, and Farm loans 
remained approximately stagnant. Statistically, only the increase in CRE loans was 
significant (p = .001). Comparing the differences in differences between the two subgroups, 
small bank acquirers experience higher increases in delinquencies in CRE loans (p = .044) 
while large bank acquirers experience higher increases in delinquencies in C&I loans (p 
= .047). 
  
 
Bank
30-89 
DELBM1
30-89 
DELAM1
30-89 
DELBM2
30-89 
DELAM2
30-89 
DELBM3
30-89 
DELAM3
Type Del-BL Ratio Total Del-BL Ratio Total
Mean
758.58 517.70 22.23
Before Merger After Merger
(1) CRE
0.55%
N
69 69 69
(2) C&I 0.37%
Std. 
Deviation
1563.99 1196.70 120.36 (3) Farm
0.02% 0.93%
Mean
1,716.12 1,763.52 1,386.66 1,513.99 192.08 184.68 (1) CRE
0.12% 0.10%
N
57 57 57 57 57 57
(2) C&I 0.09% 0.09%
Std. 
Deviation
2364.39 1955.26 1553.00 1382.25 377.74 442.09 (3) Farm
0.01% 0.23% 0.01% 0.20%
Small 
Acquiree
Large 
Acquirer
Before Merger After Merger
Changes in Delinquencies (Large Acquirer)
Avg. Business Loans
$1,463,782.23
$139,186.55
$1,690,398.12
Table 20. Changes in 30-89 Day Delinquencies (Large Acquirer) 
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These results are shown in table 22. Changes in delinquencies for no-merger large banks 
were also not significantly different at the end of the one-year period.  
I failed to reject the null hypothesis that large bank delinquencies do not significantly 
differ after the merger. As mentioned, there were no significant changes in any of the loan 
categories. For small banks, I could reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative that 
there were major increases in 30-89 day delinquencies following the merger only for CRE 
loans. Comparing the differences in differences between the two subsets, I could reject the 
null and accept the alternative that there were major differences between the changes in 30-89 
day delinquencies between the two merger types. It turned out that for CRE 30-89 day 
delinquencies small banks had significant marginal increases over large banks. It was the 
opposite for C&I loans, however, where large banks had the higher increases.    
7. Similar Large Banks 
The following table shows correlations between SBL—broken down into each value range 
for both volume and value—and total assets and total loans. A bank’s SBL and its total assets 
Bank
30-89 
DELBM1
30-89 
DELAM1
30-89 
DELBM2
30-89 
DELAM2
30-89 
DELBM3
30-89 
DELAM3
Type Del-BL Ratio Total Del-BL Ratio Total
Mean 461.29 303.91 38.43 Before Merger After Merger (1) CRE 0.73%
N 69 69 69 (2) C&I 0.48%
Std. 
Deviation
942.72 625.46 148.78 (3) Farm
0.06% 1.28%
Mean 378.44 838.80 332.55 261.38 56.83 98.98 (1) CRE 0.19% 0.30% **
N 64 64 64 64 64 64 (2) C&I 0.17% 0.09%
Std. 
Deviation
845.82 1310.14 689.66 308.90 142.42 207.58 (3) Farm
0.03% 0.39% 0.04% 0.44%
Changes in Delinquencies (Small Acquirer)
Before Merger
Small 
Acquiree
Small 
Acquirer
After Merger
$197,430.06
Avg. Business Loans
$62,923.06
$275,374.16
Table 21. Changes in 30-89 Day Delinquencies (Small Acquirer) 
**, **** Significant at .05, .001, respectively.  
% Difference % Difference Diff-Diff
Loan Type BM DEL AM DEL Change t-test BM DEL AM DEL Change t-test t-test
CRE $1,716.12 $1,763.52 2.76% 0.968 $378.44 $838.80 121.65% 0.000**** 0.044**
C&I $1,386.66 $1,513.99 9.18% 0.172 $332.55 $261.38 -21.40% 0.386 -0.047**
FARM $192.08 $184.68 -3.85% 0.405 $56.83 $98.98 74.18% 0.178 0.203
Large Acquirer Small Acquirer
Change in Delinquencies ComparisonTable 22. Change in 30-89 Day Delinquencies Comparison 
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are significantly correlated and therefore justify total assets as a criterion in comparing 
changes in SBL to similar banks operating in the same state. It was not possible to find exact 
matches, but I was able to select similar banks. Descriptives of these selections are shown in 
table 23. Also, there is very high correlation between total loans and total assets. Since total 
assets is already the main criterion in selecting similar large banks, due to the high 
collinearity between the two variables total loans was eliminated as a criterion in looking for 
other similar banks. 
 
 
From the table above, there is only a 2% difference in before merger total assets and a 
7% difference in before merger total loans. There was no significant difference found 
between the two subgroups (p = .747 and p = .390). After the merger, however, significant 
differences were found (p = .008 and p = .003). The relatively insignificant differences 
between the two data sets before the merger should also help to enable the association of 
changes in SBL to mergers. Table 25 highlights changes using the separate-entity approach. 
Using the singe-entity approach would not be very useful. The separate-entity approach 
provides more insight into how SBL changes since I am comparing merger banks to similar 
no-merger banks, if the single-entity were used essentially it would not be possible to 
BMAssets BMLoans
TotBMSBL
#
TotBMSBL
$ BMSBL#1 BMSBL#2 BMSBL#3 BMSBL$1 BMSBL$2 BMSBL$3
Spearman
's rho
BMAssets
Correlation Coefficient1.00 .949
**
.591
**
.704
**
.457
**
.614
**
.743
**
.434
**
.592
**
.744
**
Sig. (2-
tailed)
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000
N 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
BMLoans Correlation Coefficient.949
** 1.00 .588
**
.708
**
.454
**
.597
**
.746
**
.432
**
.577
**
.759
**
Sig. (2-
tailed)
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000
N 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).
Large Merger Bank Correlations
Table 23. Large Merger Bank Correlations 
Bank BM Total Assets BM Total Loans AM Total Assets AM Total Loans
Merger Bank $1,579,802.25 $1,066,016.42 $1,885,588.64 $1,240,047.65
No-Merger Bank $1,553,944.53 $991,894.85 $1,558,329.13 $961,384.71
Merger vs. No-Merger Bank Size
Table 24. Merger vs. No-Merger Bank Size 
**, Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed)  
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compare only the changes by the merger bank and the no-merger bank. The large banks that 
were involved in a merger only experienced increases in the uppermost value range while the 
no-merger banks experienced decreases in every value range for both volume and value. 
Statistically, similar no-merger banks experienced significant decreases in the first and 
second value range in terms of both volume and value. Changes in the first value range for 
volume was significant at the .05 level and the second value range was significant at the .01 
level. Changes in value for both the first and second value ranges were significant at the .01 
level. Comparing the differences in differences between the two subsets, however, show that 
large banks involved in an acquisition and no-merger large similar banks had no significant 
differences.  
 Reflecting on my results, against my hypothesis that no-merger similar banks’ 30-89 
day delinquencies do not significantly differ, I failed to accept the null hypothesis that there 
were no changes for the first two value ranges for both volume and value. However, I could 
accept the null hypothesis that there were no significant changes in the third value range for 
both volume and value. Referring to differences in differences in regards to my first 
hypothesis, I could not reject the null hypothesis that there were no significant changes under 
the more useful separate-entity approach.  
 
BM AM % BM AM %
Loan Value SBL SBL Change SBL SBL Change Diff Diff-Diff 
Volume Average Average Average Average t-test t-test
<$100K 1,189 1,083 -8.91% 639 602 -5.64% 0.042* 0.289
$100K-$250K 455 447 -1.86% 259 248 -4.02% 0.006** 0.672
$250K-$1,000K 495 512 3.35% 341 312 -8.50% 0.290 0.752
Value Average Average Average Average
<$100K $24,132.32 $21,951.94 -9.04% $12,906.05 $11,815.67 -8.45% 0.010** 0.376
$100K-$250K $48,054.90 $46,172.99 -3.92% $26,442.26 $24,796.40 -6.22% 0.010** 0.485
$250K-$1,000K $169,758.56 $171,507.16 1.03% $105,664.28 $103,406.48 -2.14% 0.350 0.989
Merger-No Merger Bank Separate Entity Changes Comparison
Merger Large Banks No Merger Large Banks
Table 25. Merger & No-Merger Bank Separate-Entity Changes Comparison 
*, ** Significant at .05, .01, respectively.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND ALTERNATIVES 
1. Possible Implications on Public Policy Issues 
The findings in the previous sections raise a few concerns regarding the availability of credit 
to certain small businesses. It was established there are differences in the way large and small 
banks monitor for loans. Large banks focus on financial factors by primarily using SBCS 
technology and small banks are more apt to use CCS in conjunction with soft-information 
dealing with prospective borrowers. In terms of dollar amount and volume number, large 
banks lend more to small businesses because of their larger sizes, but in terms of assets and 
total business loans small banks are more devoted to lending small business loans. Since 
small banks are more in number these differences in raw lending are not really a cause for 
concern. However, in the wake of the ongoing merger trend there may be a shift in small 
business lending. The point of this research was to tie the differences in lending to the 
changes that occur in lending subsequent to mergers to study the possible impact on certain 
borrowers and whether some bias may be created as more mergers occur.   
The first part of the data analysis (Results) chapter marked the differences in pre-
merger and post-merger small business lending. It was found that by using the separate-entity 
approach in no value ranges either for changes in volume or value, large banks significantly 
increased lending over small bank acquirers following a merger. For CRE loans, small 
business loan demanders of more $100K-$250K loan opportunities were better off with small 
bank acquirers. For C&I loans, demanders of more $100K-$250K loan opportunities as well 
as higher valued <$100K loans were better off with small bank acquirers. For Farm loans, 
where there is the most difference between small bank and large bank nature to lend, loans 
less than $100K and up to $250K, in terms of numbers, increase more when there is a small 
bank acquirer. In terms of the actual value of loans, in all value ranges small business owners 
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are better off with a small bank acquirer. For other Agricultural loans, in terms of volume, 
small businesses that demand more loans in the middle and uppermost value range benefit 
more from small bank acquirers. In terms of value, small business demanders for higher value 
loans in the middle value range are better off with a small bank acquirer.  
Comparison using the single-entity approach yielded different, but expected results. 
Using this method failed to take into account which bank actually makes better use of an 
acquired bank because it ignores the size of the acquired bank in comparison.  Large banks 
typically acquire larger small banks than small bank acquirers do for obvious reasons. As a 
result, I expected larger differences in differences in the increases of lending between the two 
data sets. For CRE loans, this was only true for the largest value range for both volume and 
value changes. Other value ranges showed no significant differences between large and small 
bank acquirers. The same results were found for C&I loans where there were only significant 
differences in the uppermost value range. Farm loans and Other Agricultural loans, however, 
were very different. Even using the single-entity approach, small banks increase lending more 
to these loan categories than large banks do. Small bank increases over large bank acquirers 
in volume for Farm loans were significant for the first value range and the first two value 
ranges for changes in the total dollar amount. For Other Agricultural loans, increases in terms 
of volume for all value ranges were significant and the middle section of lending in terms of 
value increases were significant.  
Findings from extant literature positing small businesses are not negatively affected 
by large bank acquirers does not show much ground in my results. Focusing on the resulting 
lending environment after mergers using the single-entity approach shows that large banks 
have an inclination to only substantially increase lending in the largest value range compared 
to small bank acquirers. Increases in other value ranges are not much different from increases 
by small bank acquirers. By using the separate-entity approach and taking into consideration 
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lending from both the acquirer and the acquiree prior to the merger, it can be seen that small 
business owners are better off with small bank acquirers. These findings are against certain 
SBCS technology objectives. 
According to survey results from Berger & Frame (2007), all large banks in their 
survey utilized SBCS for loans less than $100K and 74% of surveyed large banks used the 
technology for loans less than $250K (p. 6). This suggests that large banks do have the ability 
to use the expansion from the merger to also increase lending in other value ranges other than 
the largest value loans because the technology is widely used for rating these loan demanders. 
Notwithstanding, the SBCS technology objective regarding the increased ability for large 
banks to absorb losses due to lower transaction costs and the subsequent ability to shift away 
from their large value loan specialty is in contrast to the effects of mergers. Also, one of the 
objectives, as noted in SBCS Objectives, is “[to]…allow for equal assessment of potential 
borrowers”. This includes lending to smaller value borrowers, but it would also extend to 
other loan categories (other than the standard C&I loan). But the results showed that large 
banks tend to shift away from these types of loans as a result of the merger. As mentioned, 
small bank acquirers in most cases significantly lend more to these borrowers than large 
banks do. These findings, in effect, show the tendency for the effects of mergers to influence 
large banks to shift away from SBCS technology objectives. Even large banks that were not 
involved in a merger decreased their lending in all value ranges in terms of both volume and 
value. Decreases were only significant for the first two ranges, however, which reinforces the 
assertion that large banks are more reliable in lending the largest small business loans when 
even without the effects of mergers large banks did not show significant changes while the 
other ranges significantly dropped. After comparing the separate-entity changes of large 
merger banks to the changes by similar no-merger banks it was found that there were no 
significant differences. Therefore, in my data set using recent mergers—including similar 
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banks to those that acquired banks in a one-year time frame—it does not appear large banks 
between 2010 and 2012 have seriously increased lending to the small business community.  
Another SBCS technology objective is “[to]…increase small business lending to 
marginally-risked borrowers”. Findings in the Delinquencies section also cast doubt on this 
objective following a merger. Large bank average 30-89 day delinquencies as a percent of 
total business loans decreased following a merger while small bank average 30-89 day 
delinquencies increased. From a statistical standpoint, there were no significant increases for 
large banks in any value range which leads me to believe large banks may retain only the 
less-risky SBEs from the acquired bank portfolio. For small bank acquirers, however, there 
was at least a significant increase in CRE 30-89 day delinquencies. In jointly comparing the 
two subsets together, small bank CRE loan delinquencies are significantly marginally higher 
following a merger while C&I loan delinquencies are significantly marginally higher for 
large bank acquirers. This suggests that this objective, comparing the results to small bank 
acquirers, is apparently accomplished for C&I loan demanders but not for CRE loan 
demanders. Combining the implications mentioned above, it is possible marginally-risked 
small businesses that demand large value C&I loans are actually better off when a large bank 
acquires their bank. But for other loan demanders, a small bank acquirer provides the best 
benefit.  
The differences in the small business lending nature between large and small banks 
already affects supply and demand, but results from this study also imply that the size of 
acquirers in times of mergers is also of importance. The significance of this finding is that 
financially strong small businesses and marginally-risked small businesses do not demand the 
same types of loans. Financially sound firms would be capable to demand—and make timely 
payments for—larger loans in order to expand and make more expensive investments in light 
of these firms’ optimism. However, less financially fit firms may not have the capacity to 
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expand and are therefore more characteristic to demand lower value loans for longer 
durations. It is in this regard that there is a potential public policy concern for certain small 
businesses as mergers continue and the effects of these mergers clash against SBCS 
Technology objectives.  
2. Possible Alternatives in SBCS Implementation 
SBCS technology is not without its demerits. Besides the fact that the models are developed 
through predictive regression analysis models based on a study of past loans and as 
previously described to potentially be exposed to both type I and type II errors, the way these 
technologies are implemented in itself also leads to inefficiency. It can be observed that in at 
least two ways this is true: (1) the way in which large lenders may overuse SBCS (e.g., as the 
most significant factor in acceptance of the loans in ways of automatic acceptance or 
rejection) and (2) the lack of transparency for small businesses who wish to know the reasons 
for acceptance or rejection. In the American banking sector covering small business loans, 
after banks directly purchase ratings externally and then use these ratings to assess small 
businesses, they provide no information to small businesses that could be used to either 
increase their attractiveness to potential fund suppliers (banks, angel investors, etc.) or that 
can be used by managers to direct attention to the weak areas that were most likely the cause 
for rejection. By means of comparison, some characteristics of the implementation of SBCS 
seem to be more informative in India and could very well result in a Pareto Improvement in 
SBL if imitated in America.  
To further explain, India’s SME market is very well established and is a major contributor 
to India’s GDP. Knowing how to supply funds for growth in this sector is of high concern for 
India. Therefore, we can expect that major studies have been undertaken to ensure their 
current system is capable of doing just this. It is outside of the current research scope to 
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collect data in comparison of the two different types of implementation by the U.S. and India, 
but I do at least offer some details of India’s implementation of SBCS technology that may 
very well go to address potential issues found in the Results chapter. 
A basic principle in finance is that the cost of capital is lower in short-term 
borrowings compared to longer maturity loans. A rating system dealing with small businesses 
which can assess risks and assign a rating gives considerably more flexibility in the lending 
terms between the bank and firm. Historically, without the presence of such a system and in 
the shadow of the asymmetric information problem, small businesses had to typically 
negotiate on a longer basis because businesses tried to avoid loan rejection probability by 
limiting the number of times they applied for loans. This meant that businesses typically 
locked in higher value loans with longer terms which called for higher interest rates as a 
product of higher uncertainty in the business to pay back its obligations over a longer time 
horizon. In other words, SBEs had trouble maintaining an aggressive financial policy because 
of the lending complications that arose; acquiring repeated short-term loans was very difficult 
and even a single rejection could hurt further borrowing attempts (Kassar & Bernstein, 2011). 
According to the same study, around 73% of smaller business owners do not even bother to 
apply for a loan because of the transaction costs they would have to endure in the process or 
fear of rejection, or both. Rejections on business loans will increasingly make it more 
difficult to obtain funds from banks due to the banks’ nature to view past rejections as a 
higher exposure to risk. Therefore, SBEs tended to undertake longer-term debt contracts that 
are costly to both lenders and borrowers.  
The SBCS model possesses merit by resulting in lower associated transaction costs in 
the lending process. Lower transaction costs should not be limited to transactional lending 
institutions. It is possible for community banks to also benefit from lower transaction costs 
that would allow for a more efficient lending process to small businesses. It was established 
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that by a landslide small banks use CCS as the primary risk-assessment method. CCS is used 
in conjunction with personal characteristics of the borrower gathered from existing 
relationships which can still be observed today. With the declining market power for small 
banks, however, I contend CCS is not the small bank’s optimal option. If there was a system 
which America could imitate that may enable SBCS technology immersion among small 
banks, small banks may again become competitive against large banks and small businesses 
could also be benefited. The next section turns to India for answers.  
2.1 India’s CRISIL® and SMERA® 
India’s CRISIL® and SMERA®, two major rating agencies and the latter being a rating 
agency whose only business is directed toward rating SMEs, have a different method 
compared to America in establishing ratings for businesses.15 If adopted in America there is a 
chance it could lead to a Pareto Improvement in the sense that all parties involved with small 
business lending would be provided a positive incentive. These companies are backed by Dun 
& Bradstreet, as are the existing U.S. rating agencies, but ratings also include information 
about the business itself as well as the “relationship” factor developed through interviews 
with key personnel whereas America’s small business rating agencies generally do not. The 
following figure illustrates the process by which small business owners receive the ratings 
using these companies. 
 
                                                          
15 More information on these rating agencies can be found on their websites. CRISIL: 
http://www.crisil.com/ratings/crisil-sme-ratings.html. SMERA: http://www.smera.in/ratings/sme-ratings.aspx.  
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After a business that is interested in obtaining a rating contacts the rating agency and 
submits the necessary inquiry reports and other appropriate documents and pays the related 
fees, a team of analysts is dispatched for an on-site visit. Subsequently, a series of meetings 
with management will commence. The rating agency will then, after receiving all relevant 
and applicable information, assign a rating to the business. The businesses are informed of 
this rating and have to accept it before it is publicized. Businesses even have the authority to 
challenge the rating and once the rating is established and accepted it stays under constant 
surveillance for the life of the instrument.  
The following points were gathered from a SMERA® brochure16 which depicts a few 
characteristics of the rating agency’s framework:  
 Every rating is assigned based on a rating request by the issuer; no unsolicited ratings are 
undertaken. 
 The rating criteria are clearly and transparently spelled out and consistently applied. 
                                                          
16 http://www.scribd.com/doc/64657746/SMERA.  
(Source: SMERA’s Website16) 
Figure 6. Rating Flowchart 
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 All ratings are assigned based on written information provided by the issuer, information 
obtained from reliable sources and very important interviews with the management of the 
issuer. The discussions cover critical issues, future plans and strategies. This helps factor 
in non-public information. 
 All ratings are assigned by a committee consisting of experienced professionals and not 
by a single individual.  
 The rating assigned is communicated to the issuer along with a rating rationale.  
These points are similar with CRISIL® which also rates many SMEs in India. It is important 
to note the efficiency and fairness within these companies’ framework. First, they only 
provide ratings contingent upon the desire of the small business owner to do so. Second, a 
consistent methodology is applied. Third, financial and non-financial factors are integrated to 
factor in non-public information including the future plans of the company. Fourth, an 
experienced committee assigns the ratings. Lastly, the business owner has the right to accept 
or challenge the rating before it is publicized. The next figure shows an overview of the flow 
of information along with more detail in the following paragraphs. 
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The whole process starts with small businesses. Small businesses that are in need of 
funds can pull their information together and start the rating process with CRISIL® or 
SMERA®. These companies pull loads of information from the SBE and breaks this 
information down into two distinct categories: Financial and Non-financial blocks. Financial 
information is then broken down into specifics such as profit and growth, gearing levels, and 
liquidity ratios just to name a few. On the non-financial side, information and rating criteria is 
divided into management experience and qualifications, certifications, customer/supplier base 
the overall constitution of the firm and includes firm-specific information such as future 
business plans that may not be public knowledge. Furthermore, all data is analyzed in 
accordance to only the industry in which the company operates. By doing so, banks can truly 
trust that “apples” are getting compared to other “apples”. After these criteria for ratings are 
integrated and a rating is established, the rating is presented to the business and the business 
Figure 7. Information Flowchart 
Financial Non-Financial 
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can then decide if they want the information to be published and used. The function of choice 
residing with the SBE, coupled with the fact that no unsolicited ratings are performed, 
facilitates trust between businesses and rating agencies. This trust enables the smooth flow of 
the process without the fear of any negative consequences for small business owners. After 
the process is complete, the business possesses a rating with which it is able to use to assess 
its operations and isolate areas for improvement, as well as utilize when wanting to obtain 
funds from a bank. Naturally, if the rating is excellent then banks are able to establish the 
same risk-based loans commercial banks already enjoy and SBEs will enjoy lower borrowing 
terms. In the instance the rating is not satisfactory, the banks can make a better informed 
decision on whether to lend and modify the loan conditions to compensate for the degree of 
risk it is undertaking. In this case, it is important to note that efficiency in the lending process 
has still increased. The existence of the rating provides more symmetric information that can 
be used by both parties in multiple, beneficial ways.  
Perhaps the most important element is the fact that this type of system would make it 
entirely possible for small banks to adopt SBCS technology. Due to the rating agencies’ 
extensive small business client-base, costs are minimized for both small businesses and small 
banks. Through this venue, the rating agencies have two sources of income. The full-cost 
burden lies neither with small business owners nor small banks, yet more efficiency prevails 
as the technology can be implemented and small banks have access to more information in 
implementing risk-based lending which could lower the cost of capital for small businesses. 
The significance of the ability to use SBCS technology is that most of the large bank’s 
competitive edge funnels through this technology as transaction costs are managed and the 
speed to assess small businesses is facilitated. If small banks too could implement the 
technology while still conjunctively using soft-information dealing with both the owner and 
the business they would undoubtedly be able to recapture lost market share and regain some 
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of their once held competitive edge. Small businesses, especially firms that look lesser on 
paper, would also be benefitted because there would be less reliance on financial aspects and 
more qualitative features would be integrated into the rating. In addition, knowledge of their 
weak points allows them to strengthen themselves in order to better their business and 
maximize their chance for loan approvals. 
The difference in implementation exhibited by India could also be used to modify the 
existing system within large banks. I raise the possibility that the presence of a similar 
structure could not only maintain low transaction costs for commercial banks but also provide 
more information to small businesses. Increasing information to small businesses whether 
they receive loans from large or small banks increases chances of capital acquisition that will 
inhibit project funding and allow for more positive net present value projects to be 
undertaken. This would provide more jobs and increase supply and demand for local 
economies. As this happens across the country, over time the economy would gradually be 
boosted by a more efficient lending system involving small businesses that would raise 
morale and confidence among small business borrowers. This, in turn, could abolish the 
“hope and pray” approach of obtaining a loan from the bank and would hopefully lead to a 
decrease in the number of firms that Kassar & Bernstein (2011) pointed out do not even 
bother with starting the process. 
This all may become possible by imitating the system underway in India’s SME 
market whereby SMEs purchase the ratings and are able to use them to self-assess 
performance in order to make improvements and make their businesses more financially 
appealing. Furthermore, the business then has the option of taking the rating to the bank that 
enables the bank to assess the risk involved with lending just like American banks. The 
differences are, first, a more equal distribution of the cost burden and, second, increased 
transparency in the rating itself. This system provides a Pareto Improvement; wherein, small 
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businesses are made better off without providing any foreseeable drawbacks to the other 
parties (lenders) involved. Lastly, imitating India’s implementation would also indirectly 
address some issues found following mergers. It was established small business owners are 
mainly better off with small bank acquirers compared to banks between $1 billion and $10 
billion in assets. The presence of stronger small bank competitiveness will decrease the 
number of cases involving large bank acquirers and increase either the chance less mergers 
will happen in general or increase the number of cases the acquiring bank is another small 
bank. Doing this will likely prevent shifts in monitoring and enable increases in SBL to all 
value range and loan type demanders.  
3. Closing Statement 
The changes marked in this research deal mostly with comparing large bank ($1 billion-$10 
billion in assets) to small banks with less than $1 billion in assets. The changes marked in the 
results section focus on what occurs when these different sized banks merge. It is also crucial 
to consider these effects may be multiplied if later these large banks are acquired by even 
larger banks in excess of $10 billion assets. According to Jagtiani (2008) from 1990 to 2006, 
the same time period there was a drastic drop in the number of small banks, 70% of the 
acquisitions of these banks were by very large banks (p. 46). It is meaningful to consider not 
only the immediate effects marked in this study as a result of these mergers, but to also 
consider the increase in likelihood that these once small banks end up as part of a very large 
bank through later acquisitions and the effect it will have on SBL. Very large banks are the 
only banks from 1989 to 2006 that increased its share of assets (p. 31). In fact, in a 27-year 
period from 1984 to 2011, 2,774 banks which accounted for 20% of all institutions that 
started out with total assets less than $100 million ended up in one of the largest asset 
categories (FDIC, 2012). This and other statistics covering the merger trend from the FDIC’s 
2012 bank study casts doubt on the ability for small banks to stay competitive. Especially 
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since there is a strong tendency for small banks, even newly chartered Denovo banks, to 
eventually end up being owned by very large banks, some findings found from this research 
dealing with negative effects to small businesses will increase in magnitude. Some positive 
effects may deteriorate due to even greater reliance on SBCS technology and as distance, as 
well as other factors that influence SBL, drastically change. As mergers continue to increase 
the percent of assets held by the largest institutions, either directly or indirectly, there is a 
weaker propensity to lend to small businesses.  
Any statistical models, including both SBCS and CCS are prone to errors. There is always 
a possibility pertinent information is not publicly known making it difficult to distinguish 
between a good borrower and a bad one. Therefore, I cannot state that one is in fact better 
than the other. What I can conclude with, however, is it is important to know small banks too 
may have the option to implement the same technology as large banks which could make 
small banks more competitive and remediate some of the negative effects produced by 
mergers. Slowing the rate at which large banks acquire small banks and by increasing the 
likelihood two small banks merge would seem to provide positive effects more evenly to 
small businesses. Also, imitating India’s system in order to get SBCS in the hands of 
community banks would lead to a Pareto Improvement opportunity. In closing, there is a 
research opportunity to dive more into detail concerning this area. It would be interesting to 
collect data pertaining to SBL and delinquencies from India and compare findings and 
analyze more accurately if it would actually address the issues at hand and, if so, to what 
extent. 
Large banks will continue using SBCS technology to give them an edge over small banks. 
Michael McHugh, a regional manager for Norwest Corporation, says “Our strategy is to take 
market share from the community banks” (Zuckerman, 1996 as cited by Longenecker, 1998, 
p. 8). Surely, other large banks alike have had similar strategies to take market share away 
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from small banks leading to the great decline in the number of community banks. In order to 
stay competitive, it would also be advantageous for small banks to implement the technology. 
Small banks could use the technology for the advantages it provides to large banks, but 
conjunctively use soft-information regarding small businesses. The disadvantages of SBCS 
such as favoring businesses that are able to show strengths better on paper or having adverse 
effects on certain lenders could be overcome if community banks could integrate the use of 
soft-information and the technology. Achieving this may place the edge for small business 
lending back into the hands of small banks and consequently all types of small businesses 
regardless of loan type, loan size, or borrower would have more access to funds on a fairer 
basis.   
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